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Executive Summary
Environmental governance in Sudan is in a state of 
transition . The country is adapting to a number of 
concurrent environmental challenges associated 
with population growth, urbanisation, climate 
change, and the impacts of conflict, amongst 
others . As part of that adaptation there is a clear 
need to search for new ways of organising envi-
ronmental governance, so that natural resources 
can be managed and accessed by different 
users peacefully, equitably and sustainably . That 
search will find that much can be learned from 
experiences of other states that have faced similar 
situations and processes of transition elsewhere on 
the African continent . 
This report sets out some potential building blocks 
for reforming and rebuilding environmental govern-
ance in Sudan, drawing lessons from international 
environmental governance frameworks and 
from the experiences of other African nations, 
for example: processes to establish international 
environmental governance; how they have 
Diverse land use in the Wadi El Ku catchment in North Darfur. The clay soils of the wadi can be farmed more 
intensively than the sandy soils beyond. Managing resource use equitably in this context of variability is a key 
challenge for traditional and formal governance.
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combined customary and statutory mechanisms 
for natural resource management; and how 
they have addressed issues of land tenure in 
peace processes . The review is intended as a 
resource for all environmental and peacebuild-
ing stakeholders: policy-makers, practitioners, 
researchers and members of civil society; so that 
access to natural resources can be managed 
peacefully in the future rather than becoming a 
fault-line for violent conflict . Whilst written to inform 
environmental stakeholders across Sudan, the 
report has particular significance for Darfur where 
the need to re-establish mechanisms for sustain-
able and equitable management of the natural 
environment has been well recognised: the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) links the need 
for “developing policies and conducting neces-
sary studies for putting an end to environmental 
degradation” with the need to “mitigate conflict 
over water and pasture” .1
The general principles of good governance are 
also applicable to environmental governance: 
transparency, responsibil ity, accountabil ity, 
participation and responsiveness (to the needs 
of people) . Environmental governance may be 
defined as the norms, rules and institutions that 
regulate the decisions, actions and interactions of 
government, civil society and the private sector in 
relation to the environment . It is a broader concept 
than natural resource management (NRM) as it 
considers the wider environment and a system of 
governance that includes statutory and custom-
ary laws, policies and rules, and the institutions 
(modern and traditional) that apply and regulate 
those rules, from the regional to the national to 
the local level . Environmental governance has an 
economic and social dimension to it: it must pay 
attention to issues of social justice as well as eco-
nomic efficiency . It also has a political dimension 
in terms of participation, including participation of 
marginalised resource users . The role of women 
and the role of nomadic groups are therefore 
particularly significant . The holistic concept of 
ecosystems management usefully integrates the 
social, environmental and economic spheres 
with the intention of meeting both ecological and 
human needs now and in the future . 
Co-management of natural resources is a par-
ticularly useful and practical concept for effective 
environmental governance . It is ”a process of 
collective understanding and action by which 
human communities and other social actors man-
age natural resources and ecosystems together, 
drawing from everyone’s unique strengths, vantage 
points and capacit ies” .2 Co-management 
introduces the concept of interdependence . 
At the heart of co-management are collective 
understanding and negotiated agreements, and 
ultimately power-sharing between different users 
of natural resources . This, in turn, relates to the 
concept of entitlement to natural resources – a 
socially recognised claim which may need to be 
negotiated . 
In reality different users of natural resources often 
have conflicting needs, which gives rise to conflict 
– a widespread phenomenon in Sudan . This 
raises the issue of equity in managing or gaining 
access to natural resources . Whose entitlement to 
natural resources is most important and should be 
given priority? It is widely agreed that the primary 
users – those who directly depend upon the natural 
resource for their livelihood, for example farmers 
and pastoralists in the case of Sudan – should have 
the greatest entitlement . In practice, however, 
they may be the least powerful when compared, 
for example, with international business interests, 
especially if they are not well-organised . A chal-
lenge for effective environmental governance is 
how to protect and enshrine the characteristics of 
co-management of natural resources in legal and 
policy frameworks, how to facilitate participation 
and determine the entitlements of different actors 
in the interests of equity, as well as being responsive 
to the changing context .
The transition from customary systems of NRM 
to modern, statutory market-based systems is a 
strong theme in the literature on environmental 
governance in the Sahel (and elsewhere in Africa) . 
Much can be learned from how this has been 
managed, or not, across the African continent . 
Common property regimes (CPRs) – in which natu-
ral resources are owned, managed and/or used 
collectively by several users, either simultaneously 
or sequentially3 – have a long history in Africa . Yet 
for decades they have been poorly understood 
and their significance (for example in terms of 
facilitating equitable access to natural resources 
and sustaining local peace) under-estimated, 
especially by government planners . CPRs have 
tended to be undermined by the drive towards 
7Governance for Peace over Natural Resources
private property regimes across Africa dating back 
to colonial times . But as their value is increasingly 
recognised, backed up by research, there are now 
interesting examples of formal policies and legisla-
tion that have secured communal management 
and ownership of land, for example in South Africa, 
Mozambique and Kenya .
Environmental governance at the global level has 
much to inform environmental governance at 
the national and local levels, both in its content 
and in the process of establishing principles and 
binding agreements . A review of core concepts 
of sustainable development highlights the pitfalls 
of simplistic approaches to development and 
peace, for example, tree planting alone does not 
promote peace, but resolving issues of land tenure 
for contested forestry, establishing participatory 
forest committees and supporting revenue sharing 
from forest livelihoods contribute to peace, and 
tree planting would be an appropriate component 
of such projects . Sustainable development 
requires a balance of economic, social equity 
and environmental considerations . Equitable 
participation of all resource users in decision mak-
ing is inherent in this approach, making a key link 
with peacebuilding . Much can be done through 
demonstrating good participatory practices in 
development and recovery programming in a 
way that enables communities to build common 
approaches to equitable environmental govern-
ance . These practices need to be supported by 
efforts to strengthen government capacity as well 
as by relevant policy frameworks . A coordinated 
and strategic approach to these activities would 
enable greater consistency in adaptation and 
development of environmental governance – as 
a sustainable approach to reducing conflict over 
resources .
Land tenure, central to environmental governance, 
is often one of the most disputed issues . Yet secure 
Dagash Right Bank Food Security Scheme in Northern State. Agriculture is a vital component of Sudan’s 
economy. The issue of land use for large schemes often sits at the interface between government and 
traditional leadership. 
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land rights are now widely recognised as critical for 
peace, stability and economic growth . Land tenure 
is in constant evolution as society, the economy 
and settlement patterns change . Customary land 
tenure systems are in a state of transition across 
Africa . The challenge is managing this transition 
so that land tenure systems evolve in a way that is 
equitable and includes the recognition of women’s 
rights to land . Another challenge is managing the 
co-existence or merging of customary land tenure 
with statutory regimes . In Africa this often appears 
as ‘legal pluralism’ whereby several legal systems 
may operate at once . Whereas government policy 
across Africa used to emphasise the need to 
replace ‘customary’ with ‘modern’ tenure systems, 
this is now giving way to a recognition that land 
policies and laws must build on local practice, 
and that there is no ‘blueprint’ approach that can 
be successfully applied to different contexts and 
cultures . The Kenya Land Policy of 2007 is an interest-
ing example of how customary rights to land can be 
recognised and protected by statutory frameworks 
and legislation; unusually it also makes provision 
to secure pastoralist livelihoods and rights to land . 
Tension and disputes around customary land rights 
have emerged as fundamental grievances in 
the majority of conflicts in Africa since the 1990s, 
often because of the unclear status of customary 
land interests especially in relation to state land . 
Sudan is no exception . These tensions are driving 
millions of customary landholders around the world 
to seek statutory legal recognition of their land 
occupancy and use rights, with some promising 
examples of how this has been handled, for 
example in Tanzania . Land issues are therefore 
fundamental to peacebuilding, reconciliation 
and economic rehabilitation in most countries 
emerging from protracted conflicts . But rather 
than focus on restorative justice post-conflict, 
in other words the restitution of property to the 
displaced, the focus must usually be the reform 
of property relations where these are at the heart 
of the conflict, if peace is to last . There is valuable 
learning about how to deal with land tenure in the 
peace process from what has worked, or failed, in 
peace processes around the world . Such learning 
includes:
1 . Engaging at an early stage to ensure that land 
and property issues are placed high on the 
peacemaking agenda;
2 . Preparing for the ‘post-conflict city’, not only 
with planning and formalised programmes but 
also with programmes that focus on vulnerable 
sectors and actions that help them to secure 
rights at least cost;
3 . Getting to grips with the tenure status of 
natural resources and customary lands, which 
is particularly important in relation to the vulner-
able status of unregistered rights, especially in 
areas where natural resources are attractive to 
agri-business investors post-conflict . 
Customary mechanisms for managing natural 
resources have a long history in the Sahel, but 
there is also a history of traditional institutions for 
NRM being devalued and weakened by modern 
state policies that do not recognise them . This has 
also been an issue in Sudan as the effectiveness of 
the native administration – a traditional institution 
with NRM responsibilities – has been eroded over 
time (and for a while in the 1970s was abolished) . 
Many Sahelian countries have experimented with 
a more decentralised form of government in the 
last decade, which should, in theory, mean the 
devolution of NRM to local interests and local 
communities . In practice, partial implementation 
of decentralisation has often meant the benefits 
have been undermined .
Livel ihood and NRM systems underpinning 
pastoralist production suffer from being poorly 
understood and poorly represented in policy 
fora . This has been a significant factor where 
marginalisation of pastoralist groups has occurred . 
Encouragingly this is now changing, with countries 
in the Sahel, especially francophone countries, in 
the vanguard of demonstrating how pastoralist 
access to natural resources can be secured, thus 
giving them greater responsibility for NRM . This 
requires recognition of the economic importance 
of livestock rearing, taking account of customary 
procedures in NRM, and reinstating endogenous 
mechanisms for conflict arbitration and resolution . 
There is also learning from what has not worked, for 
example where responsibility for NRM is handed 
over to pastoral communities they must also be 
given genuine decision-making powers, and there 
must be a process whereby pastoralists are fully 
aware of the reform process and of their rights and 
responsibilities . New laws alone are not enough; 
there must be political will to implement those laws .
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The thinking and practice behind approaches 
to sustainable and equitable environmental 
governance have evolved over time; the African 
continent, and especially the Sahel, is a rich source 
of experience of what has worked in different 
contexts and why . This experience is of immediate 
relevance to Sudan as it searches for approaches 
to NRM that move beyond competition between 
livelihood groups that can quickly become 
violent in a context of conflict, to approaches that 
promote interdependence and co-management 
of natural resources . This report makes the following 
recommendations:
1 . Processes of consultation for institutional 
and constitutional reform should be sup-
ported with exposure to developments in 
environmental governance from across 
Africa. This is particularly relevant to the Darfur 
Internal Dialogue and Consultation and 
to the ongoing consultations over the new 
constitution in Sudan . 
2 . The concepts of equitable participatory 
environmental governance should inform 
peace processes in Sudan. This would be 
relevant to the border areas of Sudan and South 
Sudan; to peace processes that may emerge 
in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states; and 
to the implementation of the Doha Document 
for Peace in Darfur .
3 . The ideas from across Africa in this report 
should be made available to inform reform 
and development of environmental policy 
and institutions in Sudan. Support should be 
given to capacity building for line ministries 
with a coordinated approach at both State and 
Federal level . In particular, the Darfur Regional 
Authority should be supported in its efforts to 
formulate policies and build institutions that 
mitigate conflict over natural resources .
4 . Support should be given to projects that 
pilot and demonstrate innovation and best 
practice on environmental governance – 
inclusive processes such as community based 
natural resource management, integrated 
wadi catchment management (and IWRM 
in general) and community forestry . Where 
environmental projects (such as tree planting) 
are implemented in order to promote peace, 
then equitable environmental governance at 
local and regional levels must be emphasised 
within these projects . 
5 . Social and environmental impact assess-
ments of development projects, agricultural 
projects and concessions, mining and 
peacekeeping operations should include 
a sound understanding of the governance 
context in which they operate. For example, 
if hafirs are built through humanitarian aid, then 
the work should be undertaken in collaboration 
with both formal government bodies such as 
the state water corporation and with local 
community or traditional leadership to ensure 
consultation around community access and 
to clarify responsibilities for management and 
maintenance of the hafir . 
6 . The principles and practices identified in 
this report should be developed further 
in the context of thematic areas within 
environmental governance – to draw out 
the implications, for example, for water 
resource management, forestry, agriculture, 
livestock production and mining. Important 
emerging initiatives on this include Integrated 
Water Resource Management, National 
Adaptation Plan – (NAP and NAPA), REDD Plus, 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management, and 
work on pastoralist livelihoods . In addition to the 
issues addressed in this report, further attention 
is needed on ecosystems management and 
the green economy . 
7 . Best practice and experience of par-
ticipatory policy-making on environmental 
governance should inform cross cutting 
issues in strategic plans. These would 
include capacity building, conflict-sensitive 
approaches and the environment. In the 
UN context these have all been highlighted 
as cross cutting in the 2013-16 Sudan UNDAF .4 
Other processes would include government 
strategic planning, the Humanitarian Work Plan 
and UNAMID/UNCT joint planning mechanisms . 
These features should be emphasised in 
the follow up to the Darfur Joint Assessment 
Mission and the implementation of the Darfur 
Development Strategy .
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Introduction1
The purpose of researching and writing this review 
of environmental governance is to provide a 
resource for policy-makers, project staff, peace-
makers and civil society in Sudan . Experience 
and ideas from across the African continent are 
presented and discussed with reference to the 
Sudanese context . Environmental governance is 
undergoing a process of change in Sudan, with 
new patterns of interaction between traditional 
and formal leadership, reform and realignment 
of ministry mandates, and a growing awareness 
of the need to link sound environmental practices 
with local peace building . 
This report is one of three documents on envi-
ronmental governance being prepared by UNEP 
under its “Sudan Integrated Environment Project” . 
The purpose of the project is to support “improved 
sustainable and equitable governance, manage-
ment and use of environmental resources” . 
These reports have been prepared as a source 
of information, but they are also linked both to 
ongoing processes of policy reform (Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM), climate 
change etc .), and to the implementation of new 
approaches, for example in community-based 
natural resource management (CBNRM) . Therefore 
the report aims to provide both a conceptual 
foundation for policy on environmental govern-
ance, and a practical reflection on how these 
issues have been addressed elsewhere in Africa .
Sudan, as a whole, is in a process of transition . 
Expert consultations are taking place as a 
foundation for a new constitution . Organisations 
of government are being realigned5 . These 
changes in government are, in part, a response 
to the secession of the South, which has radically 
changed Sudan’s natural resource base and 
hence its economy, and to other transitions within 
Sudan, some of which have been taking place 
over many years . As in much of Africa, South 
America, Canada, Australia and elsewhere, the 
interaction between traditional leadership and 
modern government is changing . This is particularly 
significant to governance relating to land, natural 
resources and local dispute resolution . Factors 
such as population growth and urbanisation are 
creating new networks of relationships and new 
patterns of human interaction with the natural 
environment . Compounding these challenges, 
the impacts of climate change are putting further 
stress on the interaction between communities 
and their environment . This brings the focus and 
terminology of adaptation as a core concern of 
environmental governance, as communities and 
authorities adapt to these concurrent processes 
of change . 
Whilst the behaviour of individuals and communi-
ties, particularly in terms of the changes made 
to their livelihood strategies, is one aspect of 
adaptation, another important lens is the context 
The Forty Days Road is an important traditional route for camel trading between Sudan and Egypt. This 
herd of camels have travelled 400 km from Abu Hamra and has a further 600 km to go to Assuit. They are 
approaching the border crossing with Egypt, where modern systems of governance meet the conventions of 
this ancient route.
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created to enable change – the enabling environ-
ment . The issue of livelihoods and adaptation, 
therefore, cannot be considered independently 
from that of governance . As Sudan responds to 
the loss of oil revenue from the South, the focus 
of the economy is increasingly shifting towards 
agriculture and livestock . For this transition to be 
promoted in a manner that supports, rather than 
undermines, local social cohesion in areas of 
agricultural expansion, a nuanced approach to 
dialogue between the private sector, traditional 
and government leadership and local communi-
ties is needed . The same applies to the growth 
in gold mining in Sudan, which is increasing 
both in its artisanal form and with commercial 
mining concessions . Gold-mining and agriculture 
both depend upon the interaction of people, 
natural resources and land – core concerns for 
environmental governance .
Within this broad context of change, resolution to, 
and recovery from conflict is a key concern for 
many in Sudan . The protracted conflicts in Darfur, 
South Kordofan and Blue Nile State have under-
mined environmental governance, sometimes 
with disastrous consequences . Competition over 
access to natural resources, especially rangeland 
and forests, is one of the ways in which the conflict 
plays out at the local level between different groups 
(for example between, or amongst, pastoralists 
and agriculturalists, and between different ethnic 
groups), often violently, beyond the reach of any 
functioning environmental governance mecha-
nisms . In Darfur, environmental degradation has 
been particularly severe around the main urban 
areas and camps for internally displaced people 
(IDPs), both of which have seen populations soar 
since the outbreak of the conflict . As this review 
demonstrates, effective environmental govern-
ance is closely linked to functional governance 
more generally at all levels . Failing governance 
has been both a factor contributing to, and a 
consequence of the conflicts .6 As Darfur searches 
for a lasting solution to the conflict at all levels, a key 
part of the process is to re-establish mechanisms 
for sustainable and equitable management of the 
natural environment . The need for this has been 
well recognised: the Doha Document for Peace 
in Darfur (DDPD) links the need for “developing 
policies and conducting necessary studies for 
putting an end to environmental degradation” 
with the need to “mitigate conflict over water and 
pasture” .7 The urgency of this is clear: the prospects 
for peace and recovery in Darfur depend upon 
it . This also sets environmental governance as 
key element to mitigating the risk of conflict 
elsewhere . 
Any solution needs to be informed by the historic 
strengths and experience of customary systems 
for NRM, but a solution cannot depend solely on 
the past for the simple reason that the context has 
changed so markedly . Indeed, since the decline 
of the Native Administration in the early 1970s the 
population of Darfur has multiplied by a factor 
of seven, and rainfall patterns have changed 
significantly .8 Approaches to sustainable and 
equitable natural resource management that are 
appropriate for today’s challenges, must take into 
account the successes and failures of the past in 
Sudan, and learning from experience elsewhere in 
Africa and beyond . These must be adapted to the 
emerging pattern of human settlement in Darfur, 
for example with a more urbanised, more youthful, 
and more mobile population . This learning can 
inform government in other parts of Sudan to assist 
them in their own processes of managing the 
environment in a way that builds the economic 
development of Sudan and avoids the dangers 
of tensions relating to change, which spill over into 
violence that have been so disastrous in Darfur, 
Blue Nile and South Kordofan .
Two additional reports in this series on environmen-
tal governance are:
•	 ‘Environmental Governance in Sudan – An 
Expert Review’ – this report has been written 
by two senior Sudanese academics with envi-
ronmental expertise and provides an overview 
and critical analysis of policy and legislation for 
environmental governance in Sudan;
•	 ”Relationships and Resources – a theory of 
change for governance, resilience and peace-
building with respect to natural resources” . – this 
report looks at the interaction of institutions 
working on both peacebuilding and environ-
mental governance, acknowledging that the 
environmental line ministries ultimately have 
responsibility for bringing users of resources 
together to promote means by which they 
are shared equitably . It also acknowledges 
the problems of fragmented approaches to 
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environmental governance . It reviews practical 
steps to developing and measuring activities to 
improve the interaction amongst institutions and 
communities on environmental management .
The scope of the literature reviewed in this study 
is broad, but has been selected according to its 
relevance to current conditions and challenges 
in Sudan today . The report starts by reviewing the 
most commonly-used definitions of governance 
(section 2), and then reviews some of the wider 
literature on environmental governance and 
natural resource management, exploring key con-
cepts such as property regimes and entitlements 
(section 3) . Section 4 explores how development 
of international environmental governance informs 
national governance, both in terms of its content 
and its development . It reviews the links between 
social equity, economy and environment at the 
core of Sustainable Development based agree-
ments with a view to illuminating links between 
development and peace . It sets this in the context 
of Darfur and describes steps to developing shared 
pathways towards sustainable development and 
by extension conditions conducive to peace 
relating to natural resources .
Land tenure is central to environmental govern-
ance . A large amount of research has been 
carried out on land tenure around the world, 
producing a rich literature . Section 5 focuses on 
two aspects of land tenure that are particularly 
relevant to Sudan: how customary land tenure is 
evolving within Africa, and experiences of dealing 
with land tenure post-conflict as well as in the 
peacebuilding process . What can be learned 
from the experience of environmental govern-
ance in other Sahelian countries is the focus of 
section 6 . This covers customary mechanisms for 
environmental governance and shared manage-
ment of natural resources, and decentralisation of 
government and natural resource management . 
Pastoralism as a system of production practised 
across the Sahel has long been dependent on 
common property regimes, yet these can be 
challenging to, and challenged by, formal state-
based approaches to environmental governance . 
Some of the literature on pastoralism in the Sahel 
and on securing pastoralist rights is reviewed in 
section 7 . The concluding section 8 provides an 
overall summary of the implications of this literature 
review for ongoing debates on environmental 
governance within Sudan and especially Darfur . 
Box 1. UNEP’s Sudan Integrated Environment Project (SIEP)
UNEP’s programme in Sudan aims to support the development of practical and workable solutions for the management 
and governance of the environment in Sudan. This review is designed to accompany the practical interventions being 
made by UNEP and its partners. The combined objective is to introduce trial and communicate potential adaptations 
of environmental governance that may then be adopted, modified or rejected by Sudanese decision makers. The 
work is led by our Sudanese hosts and counterparts as part of UNEP’s overall support to the Ministry of Environment 
Forests and Physical Development, and the UN Country Team. SIEP is undertaken with financial support from UKAid.
The themes on which UNEP focuses in Sudan are those with governance issues at their core – where numerous 
livelihood groups depend on the same natural resource and shared access to it needs to be negotiated. They comprise: 
water resource management, forestry, community environmental management, climate change and pastoralist 
livelihoods (in collaboration with Tufts University). The synergy between institutional work and implementation is 
designed both to develop ‘buy in’ for processes and to ground them in the realities of programme implementation. 
For more information see www.unep.org/sudan 
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A review of environmental governance should 
start by revisiting the concept of governance, a 
concept that has gained growing attention in 
policy-making and debates about international 
development since the mid-1990s . At that time 
it became increasingly apparent that there is a 
“vital connection between open, democratic 
and accountable systems of government and 
respect for human rights, and the ability to achieve 
sustained economic and social development” 
(OECD/ DAC, 1995: 5) . ‘Good governance’ 
became a stated development objective .
Definitions of governance abound . Box 2 presents 
three of the most widely-used definitions from 
UNDP, the European Commission (EC) and the 
World Bank, respectively . Common themes in these 
three definitions relate to how society organises 
itself and about the relationship between the state 
(or authority) and its citizens . The UNDP definition 
usefully distinguishes between three spheres in 
society: the state, civil society and the private 
sector; these distinctions are used throughout this 
literature review . Words such as rules, institutions, 
policies, processes and traditions are used to 
describe how society manages its affairs, through 
which interests are articulated and differences 
negotiated . Whereas the emphasis in the UNDP 
definition is on how society manages itself, the EC 
and World Bank definitions are more state-oriented . 
Box 2. Definitions of Governance
UNDP 
Governance is the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political 
and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. It is the way a 
society organises itself to make and implement decisions— achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action. 
It comprises the mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate their interests, mediate their 
differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices that set limits and 
provide incentives for individuals, organisations and firms. Governance, including its social, political and economic 
dimensions, operates at every level of human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality, nation, region 
or globe.
UNDP Strategy Note on Governance for Human Development, 2004
The European Commission
Governance concerns the state’s ability to serve the citizens. It refers to the rules, processes, and behaviours by 
which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. The way public functions 
are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised is the major issue to be 
addressed in this context. In spite of its open and broad character, governance is a meaningful and practical concept 
relating to the very basic aspects of the functioning of any society and political and social systems. It can be described 
as a basic measure of stability and performance of a society. As the concepts of human rights, democratisation 
and democracy, the rule of law, civil society, decentralised power sharing, and sound public administration, gain 
importance and relevance as a society develops into a more sophisticated political system, governance evolves 
into good governance.
Communication on Governance and Development, October 2003, COM (03) 615
World Bank 
We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common 
good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity 
of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.
http://go.worldbank.org/MKOGR258V0 (accessed on 19 October 2011)
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UNDP has identified five principles of good 
governance9:
•  participation and voice – related to consensus-
orientation, mediating differing interests to reach 
a broad consensus on what is in the best interest 
of the group and, where possible, on policies 
and procedures;
•  accountability – this also includes transparency, 
in terms of accessible information, processes 
and institutions;
•  equity – which relates to Rule of Law (legal frame-
works should be fair and enforced impartially, 
particularly the laws on human rights);
•  direction – this relates to strategic vision: leaders 
and the public have a broad and long-term 
perspective on good governance and human 
development, along with a sense of what is 
needed for such development;
•  performance – institutions and processes should 
be responsive in trying to serve all stakeholders, 
and should be effective and efficient, producing 
results that meet needs while making the best 
use of resources .
These have been adapted by UNHCHR10 as:
•	 transparency; 
•	 responsibility; 
•	 accountability; 
•	 participation; 
•	 responsiveness (to the needs of the people) .
UNESCO-IHE takes a more practical approach to 
defining governance: Governance is the process 
of taking care of public interests of general 
application through leading, ruling planning, 
managing, controlling, correcting the organisa-
tional resources.11 
They define the scope of each part of these as:
•	 Leading – establishing vision, policy and 
strategy;
•	 Ruling – setting up legislation and regulations;
•	 Planning and Management – setting and 
implementing strategy, designing and imple-
menting operations;
•	 Controlling – defining standards, issuing 
licences and permits;
•	 Correction – enforcement and sanctioning .
That there is a wide range of definitions of 
governance can be accounted for perhaps 
by the variety in the contexts, mandates and 
cultures of the organisations that issued those 
definitions . In different cases there is a different 
balance of emphasis, either focusing on the 
relationship between the government and citizens, 
or between individuals or groups of citizens . In the 
latter case, the government has a role in creating 
the environment in which these relationships are 
managed . Within the same context different 
themes of governance will also reflect different 
aspects . For example, urban waste management 
reflects the relationship between the state (the 
municipality) and the citizens (urban residents 
who pay their rates) . In contrast, governance of a 
community forest has a greater emphasis on the 
horizontal aspect of citizens organising themselves 
to achieve a common benefit . In this context, the 
role of the government is important in enabling 
and overseeing this collective activity but takes 
less of a role itself . This balance of a vertical social 
contract where government provides services and 
a more local horizontal social contract, regulated 
by government (and so again part of the contract) 
is an important theme behind environmental 
governance .12
The UNESCO-IHE definition is given on a water man-
agement course and reflects the key processes in 
formal water governance with an emphasis on the 
role of government . In the case of the governance 
of the water sector, there is a strong element of 
the relationship between government and citizens 
through the provision and maintenance of infra-
structure, but also a significant element in which 
government regulates the interaction of different 
users . These two elements meet in the process 
of consultations over investment planning for the 
provision of infrastructure . In rural Sudan there is an 
additional complexity with the relatively common 
practice of communities being responsible, in 
part, for maintenance . The effectiveness of these 
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processes has a considerable bearing on the 
overall relationship between communities who 
share water resources and their relationship with 
government authorities . 
Any given government may need to govern 
different aspects and different areas with different 
relative emphases on these aspects of govern-
ance . In Sudan, different conditions prevail in rural 
and urban environments and different approaches 
to environmental governance prevail .
Two further points should be clarified before we can 
be satisfied that we have built an adequate basis 
on which to discuss environmental governance . 
The first is the distinction between environmental 
governance and NRM . This report relates to the 
environment rather than to natural resources and 
so includes concerns relating to the management 
of pollution . Pollutants are part of the environment 
but are not considered a resource . Therefore the 
word environment has a larger scope than the 
term natural resources . The second point is the 
distinction between situations in which the man-
agement and governance of the environment is 
administered by one group of people – such as 
a livelihood group – and situations in which it is 
administered by a number of groups . In cases of 
the management, sustainability, in a more limited 
sense, is the principal focus; in cases of the latter, 
sustainability and equitability are joint concerns . 
Equitability in this context requires the consideration 
of issues addressed in governance agendas such 
as the rule of law, participation, and processes of 
democracy . Environmental governance therefore 
has a broader role overall than natural resource 
management, which is technically a more techni-
cally issue . 
A public consultation on IWRM policy chaired by the deputy governor of South Darfur in December 2011. 
Lessons learnt from South Africa’s IWRM experience are being reviewed to inform the process of policy 
development in the state.
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Defining Environmental Governance3
3.1  What is environmental 
governance?
Current international debates around ‘environmen-
tal governance’ date back to the treatise of the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ in the 1960s (Hardin, 
1968) . From early on these debates have been 
closely associated with issues of environmental 
degradation and how to prevent it . Much of the 
current literature on environmental governance 
takes a global perspective and is focused on 
international agreements and conventions13, see 
section 4 below . At the local level the literature 
focuses more on NRM with considerable attention 
paid to informal governance solutions . See, for 
example, Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2007), one 
of the most substantial texts on NRM, extensively 
drawn on here because of its relevance to 
the Sudan context . Borrini-Feyerabend et al 
capture some of the tensions between global 
and local governance mechanisms, highlighting 
how local users and local communities are 
increasingly caught in the contradiction of global 
governance systems whereby global rules and the 
concentration of economic power can undermine 
community control over natural resources despite 
trends towards decentralisation of government 
which usually aim to empower at the local level . 
Much of the literature refers to the environment as 
a holistic concept beyond the natural environment 
to include, for example, culture . Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al (2007) define natural resources as:
those components of nature that are being 
used or are estimated to have a use for 
people and communities . In this sense, what 
is a “resource” is culturally and technologically 
determined . Cultures shape demand: until 
they create a use for it, a resource remains 
latent . Similarly, the development of technol-
ogy can promote new uses and thus discover 
new resources (e .g . oil and natural gas) . (ibid:7) 
A number of authors are critical of how ‘successful’ 
environmental governance and NRM are defined 
in economic terms, with collateral damage 
in terms of human and cultural losses seen as 
inevitable side-effects . This is explored further 
below . The concept of ecosystems management 
is useful in integrating the social, environmental 
and economic spheres with the intention of 
meeting both ecological and human needs in 
the future . Thus, it is a holistic approach and may 
be applied to manage geographically-defined 
ecological systems .14
In terms of the overall aims of an effective NRM 
system, Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2007) make a 
useful contribution . An NRM system regulates the 
interplay between human activities and the natural 
environment . Its major outputs include:
1 . human survival and the satisfaction of human 
needs through productive activities e .g . farm-
ing, livestock production, timber production;
2 . the transformation of portions of the natural 
environment into a domesticated environment, 
more suited to being exploited (e .g . clearing 
of agricultural land, management of grazing 
land and forests);
3 . the control of natural environmental hazards 
(flood prevention, fighting vectors of disease);
4 . the control of degradation and hazards caused 
by human pressure on the environment .
How this is organised and regulated is the essence 
of environmental governance .
Paavola (n .d .) unpacks environmental governance 
into a number of generic functions:
1 .  exclusion of unauthorised users; 
2 . creation of entitlements to regulate authorised 
resource use; 
3 . provisioning of joint-impact or non-rival goods; 
4 . sharing the benefits of resource use and the 
costs of its provisioning; 
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5 . monitoring of resource users; 
6 . enforcement of the rules of resource use; 
7 . resolution of conflicts over resource use; 
8 . collective choice for the modification of 
governance solutions .
How these functions are organised depends 
on whether the governance mechanisms are 
customary, in which case the community may 
perform a number of these functions, or formal, 
in which case there is more likely to be a division 
of labour, for example between legislatures which 
make the rules and specialised agencies which 
monitor and enforce them . 
Paavola (n .d .) also provides a categorisation of 
institutional rules associated with environmental 
governance functions, as follows: 
1 . rules of exclusion; to ensure unauthorised 
access is curtailed;
2 . entitlement rules regulating authorised resource 
use and resolving conflicts between legitimate 
users;
3 . monitoring rules;
4 . decision-making rules; to determine how deci-
sions can be made and who can participate .
His further contribution is in introducing institutional 
economics to environmental governance . He 
rejects some of the conventional economic 
concepts associated with environmental govern-
ance, such as the concept of ‘externalities’ for 
which no price is paid and no compensation 
received . Instead, he introduces the idea of 
interdependence, where the choice of one agent 
influences that of another . He makes the point that 
environmental governance is “a matter of social 
justice rather than economic efficiency, demand-
ing greater emphasis on public participation as the 
foundation of… political legitimacy” (ibid: abstract) . 
Environmental governance is ‘best understood as 
the resolution of environmental conflicts by estab-
lishing, reaffirming or changing environmental 
governance institutions’, which in turn establish, 
reaffirm or redefine entitlements (ibid: 1) . This way of 
thinking seems particularly appropriate and useful 
in the context of rural Sudan where there is a high 
level of interdependence between the livelihoods 
of different groups and issues of social justice which 
have emerged prominently during the conflict .
Cattle waiting to be watered at a traditional well in Garba Tula District, Northern Kenya. This well used by 
numerous pastoralist livelihood groups and is governed by a combination of customary rules and new 
arrangements including the appointment of well managers. Darfuri government stakeholders visited this 
location as part of a knowledge sharing initiative on co-management in environmental governance.
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The concept of interdependence is developed 
by Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2007) through the 
increasingly popular theme of ‘co-management’ 
of natural resources: ”a process of collective 
understanding and action by which human com-
munities and other social actors manage natural 
resources and ecosystems together, drawing from 
everyone’s unique strengths, vantage points and 
capacities” (ibid: xxx ) . They provide a number 
of characteristics of co-management systems 
which could serve as a checklist for effective 
environmental governance, see Box 3 . At the 
heart of the process lie collective understanding 
and negotiated agreements: it is about sharing 
power . The challenge for environmental govern-
ance is to protect and enshrine as many of these 
characteristics as possible in legal and policy 
frameworks . 
Practitioners can build these principles into projects 
of various scales . An example of co-management 
at the local level in Sudan is the “Community 
Environmental Action Plan” (CEAP), developed with 
support from UNHCR15 for refugee camps in Eastern 
Sudan to reduce tension between refugee and 
host communities in their use and management 
of natural resources . The CEAP approach uses a 
structured collective processes of assessment, 
decision-making and planning of NRM for the 
common benefit of all participants . These 
processes include participatory rural appraisals, 
community mapping, and vision building exercises 
to compile the details of what the common good 
actually is . Then they look towards the structured 
and monitored implementation of a joint plan to 
achieve the benefits that have been envisaged 
during the consultation process .
Box 3. The characteristics of co-management systems
Co-management capitalises on multiplicity and diversity: partnership should build upon complementarity between 
groups; the challenge is to ensure that the pay-offs for those involved are greater for collaboration than for competition
Co-management is usually multi-party but also multi-level and multi-disciplinary: the emphasis is on inclusiveness, 
but this must be balanced by the need to contain transaction costs
Co-management is based upon a negotiated, joint decision-making approach and some degree of power-sharing 
and fair distribution of benefits among all institutional actors: this may require some redressing of power imbalances 
in society
Co-management attempts to achieve more equitable management: thus, all relevant actors must be involved, 
according to their entitlements (see below)
Co-management stands on the principle of linking management rights and responsibilities: when these are de-linked, 
both are likely to be eroded
Collaborative management stands on the concept of common good, the trust that it is possible to follow a course 
of action that harmonises different interests while responding, at least to some extent, to all of them: an inclusive 
approach to identifying institutional actors and negotiating management agreements is necessary in order to identify 
the common good, and for it to be achieved
Co-management is part of a broad social development towards more direct and collaborative democracy: this 
requires some organisation of civil society, that must assume increasingly important roles and responsibilities
Effective co-management depends on quality of public opinion: it must recognise differences in opinion while 
building on underlying common interest. Free flows of information and transparency in management processes 
are essential for this.
Co-management initiatives can take on a large variety of shapes and forms and need to be tailored to fit the unique 
needs and opportunities of each context: for example, approaches to stakeholder participation must be sensitive 
to the historical, cultural and socio-political context.
Co-management builds upon what exists, in particular local, traditional institutions for resource management: these 
should be the starting point, while still drawing on the creativity of new management partners
Co-management is a process requiring on-going review and improvement rather than the strict application of a 
set of established rules: its most important result is not a management plan but rather a management partnership 
that has the flexibility to respond to varying needs.
Source: Borrini-Feyerabend et al, 2007: 103-105
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Elsewhere in Eastern Sudan, participatory environ-
mental management is being implemented by 
the Eastern Nile Water Management Project which 
includes activities in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan . 
The project addresses NRM, water harvesting and 
sustainable agriculture, income generating activi-
ties and capacity building . A key component of 
the project is undertaken by community watershed 
team, which acts as a sub-committee of the 
village development councils . In Sudan work is 
being undertaken in Lower Atbara, Dinder National 
Park and Ingessara in Blue Nile State . In North 
Darfur, a local NGO, the Darfur Development and 
Reconstruction Agency (DRA) and Practical Action 
have taken up similar approaches to manage 
natural resources at the community level .16 Section 
6 below presents some more positive examples of 
co-management of natural resources .
Box 3 illustrates Narayanan and Chourey’s (n .d .) 
point that environmental governance is not just 
techno-managerial but also political: ”democratic 
governance of natural resources… demands a 
conceptual understanding inclusive of mobilisa-
tion” (of marginalised members of society) (ibid) . 
It must ensure that the interests of the weakest 
actors (often local communities) are protected 
by reliable conflict management, arbitration 
and legal enforcement procedures and by the 
judicial system: ‘it is only in the political moment of 
acceptance and recognition by society that those 
interests and concerns become “entitlements”’ 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al, 2007: 60)17: In short, the 
principles of co-management match some of the 
basic principles of good governance mentioned 
above, such as equity and ensuring participation 
and voice . Responsiveness is a feature of effective 
NRM emphasised by a number of authors – 
responsiveness not just to the needs of the people, 
but also to demographic, economic, social and 
cultural changes that affect environments and 
human communities . Indeed, Borrini-Feyerabend 
A community mapping exercise in Maba, North Darfur. This is part of the development of a Community 
Environmental Action Plan (CEAP). The community representatives use the map to negotiate a shared vision 
for resource use in the village.
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et al (2007) observe that conventional governance 
structures based on centralised and hierarchical 
authority are increasingly inadequate and that 
more flexible institutions are needed . They go as 
far as to say that: ‘a limited space of anarchy (“…
absence of fixed governing structures”)[promotes] 
democratic experimentalism, which, in turn, is likely 
to foster more resilient and stronger societies’ (ibid: 
62) . This is an interesting statement when reflecting 
upon the way that particular ethnic and livelihood 
groups in Darfur are negotiating agreements with 
each other – agreements that include elements 
of NRM – in the current Darfur conflict as govern-
ance has broken down; they are often making 
these agreements outside the structures of formal 
governance . How democratic this ‘experiment’ is 
requires further investigation .
Drawing on all of the above, this review proposes 
the following working definition of environmental 
governance:
the norms, rules and institutions that regulate 
the decisions, actions and interactions of 
government, civil society18 and the private 
sector in relation to the environment.
This is represented in the model in Figure 1 . This 
captures the dynamic between the rules, laws and 
policies (whether formal, statutory or customary) that 
regulate and determine human behaviour towards 
the environment, the institutions that make the rules 
and monitor their implementation (whether part 
of the modern state or a higher regional body, or 
part of traditional community institutions), and the 
natural environment itself which is also constantly 
changing . It is the interaction between the three 
points of the triangle that determines human 
action in relation to the environment . In terms of 
the three pillars of the Institutional Framework for 
Sustainable Development (IFSD) – see Section 4 
below – this captures the interaction between the 
social (people), economic (including markets) and 
Laws, policies, rules
(formal, statutory, customary)
Institutions
(regional, national, local; 
modern & traditional)
The natural
environment
Human action 
in relation to 
the environment
Figure 1. Analytical model of Environmental Governance
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environmental spheres . Sustainable and equitable 
environmental governance means sound envi-
ronmental stewardship, a resilient economy, and 
equitable outcomes for society .
3.2  Property regimes and  
entitlement: key concepts 
in environmental 
governance
A commonly used typology for property regimes 
comprises four categories: 
•	 open access or res nullius; 
•	 common property;
•	 state property; 
•	 private property . 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989) 
A common property regime falls under the jurisdic-
tion of a community of users, usually a residential 
group small enough for the sanction and pressure 
of peers to be significant in self-regulation . To be 
sustainable it must have a defined membership, 
e .g . a pastoralist group, or kinship group (Murphree, 
1997 in Borrini-Feyerabend et al, 2007) .
Some authors have called for a modification of 
this four-category typology by a ”scheme which 
identifies private ownership, collective ownership 
and res nullius as the main type of governance 
solutions” (Paavola, n .d .); for example the state 
can be a private owner (e .g . state-owned farms 
in Sudan), or a participant in common ownership 
arrangements (for example as custodian of forest 
reserves in Sudan through the Forestry National 
Corporation) . Murphree (1997) makes the point 
that ownership is never total or unconditional, but is 
rather a set of entitlements to use a territory or set of 
natural resources with some limitations according 
to the entitlement of others .
The concept of entitlement is key to NRM and 
environmental governance and is given extensive 
coverage in the literature .19 Borrini-Feyerabend et 
al (2007) describe the entitlement to manage 
land or to a set of natural resources as a social 
construct – i .e ., a socially recognised claim – which 
may be determined by statutory law, customary 
law or the basic tenets of social life . Leach et al 
(1997) developed the concept of an extended 
entitlement approach, which ”sees entitlements 
as the outcome of negotiations among social 
actors, involving power relationships and debates 
over meaning rather than simply the result of 
fixed moral rules encoded in law” . Power can be 
exercised coercively (for example through the gun 
and threat of violence, as has happened during 
the conflict in Darfur), it can be exercised through 
the power of position (for example, a government 
official in authority), through economic power 
(commanding financial resources), or through 
political power (for example, having a powerful 
supportive constituency) .
Closely related to the concept of entitlement 
is the issue of equity in managing, or gaining 
access to natural resources . If all social actors do 
not deserve the same entitlement, then to whom 
should priority be given? Different authors make 
different distinctions between actors, as explained 
in Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2007):
•	 Murphree (1994) distinguishes between commu-
nity institutional actors, government institutional 
actors and non-governmental institutional 
actors, arguing that the first set of actors – local 
actors – should have a pre-eminent position in 
management decisions .
•	 Ostrom (1990) distinguishes between resource 
‘appropriators’ (that harvest or pull out resources) 
and resource ‘providers’ (that create, maintain 
or restore a resource) . (NB one actor can be 
both appropriator and provider) . Providers 
should have stronger grounds to claim resource 
entitlements than pure appropriators .
•	 Gorman (1995) distinguishes between primary 
users (who directly depend upon the resource 
for their livelihood, for example farmers and 
pastoralists in Darfur), and secondary users 
(whose use follows harvesting, for example 
livestock traders and consumers of meat in 
Darfur) . 
Common to all three arguments is the notion 
that the local primary user (as long as they are 
also playing a ‘provider’ role) should have the 
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greatest entitlement (and the ‘local primary user’ 
usually includes both rich and poor households 
within the local community) .20 But in practice, the 
local primary users may be the weakest in terms 
of power, whether political or economic . Some 
primary users may actually be ‘powerless’ if they 
are not sufficiently organised .
It is for this reason that many customary and 
community-based NRM systems have been 
“overlooked, negated or simply crushed in the 
name of modernisation and development” (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al, 2007: XXIX) . A strong theme in 
this text and in the literature related to the Sahel is 
that of the transition from customary or indigenous 
systems of NRM to modern, statutory market-based 
systems . The literature notes the different motivations 
of each, different cultures and sources of power, 
and of how it can go wrong .21 Co-management 
of natural resources, described above, has been 
offered as an effective alternative .
3.3  Common property 
resources
Cotula et al (2005: 1) define the commons as 
”natural resources that are owned, managed 
and/or used collectively by several users, either 
simultaneously or sequentially; irrespective of 
the economic nature of the resource (whether 
‘common pool’ or not) and of the property regime 
formally applicable to it (i .e . even if legally-owned 
by the state)” . However, many systems that 
manage the commons are a blend of different 
property regimes – common, private and state 
property .22 This is clearly true in Darfur, where the 
three regimes are juxtaposed and overlap . 
The Jizzu grazing areas in North Darfur. Grazing in this area is very localised and dependent on recent rains. 
Mobility is an essential strategy to capitalise on the availability of resources. Camel herders use this area in 
the summer months. These common property resources are controlled by traditional leadership. The non-
monetised benefits derived from these areas often mean that they are not well reflected in land use planning 
and management.
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Common property regimes or management 
systems can be said to exist when an identifiable 
group controls the rights to use resources, and 
designs and implements rules to define who may 
use the resources and how . Common property 
regimes are often clearest in the case of pastoralist 
property regimes (see Lane, 1998) . Members of the 
group limit their individual claims in the expectation 
that others will do the same . The literature on 
common property resources emphasises the 
importance of homogeneity amongst resource 
users in order for common property regimes to 
work, with high levels of trust and social cohe-
sion – conditions that are rarely met in the Sahel 
where pastoralists and farmers are often using the 
same natural resources . Indeed, where common 
property regimes have been disrupted or broken 
down, open access systems may develop where 
access to resources is uncontrolled resulting in 
severe environmental degradation . Situations 
such as these are often then used as evidence 
in support of an argument for replacing common 
property regimes with privatisation (Ostrom, 1990) .
Promoting private property regimes in Africa has 
a long history dating back to colonial times when 
many customary land tenure systems based on 
common property were dismantled in order to 
expropriate land . This trend has continued since, 
sometimes with renewed momentum in post-
colonial governments . In terms of current policies, 
Cotula et al (2005) point out how Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Processes (PRSPs) rarely acknowledge the 
importance of the commons: policy-makers pay 
little attention to the significance of the commons 
to people’s livelihoods, and the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ argument (e .g . overgrazing) is still used 
by governments across the world, to undermine 
local management systems and to claim control 
over natural resources . However, there is a growing 
body of literature from the Sahel that documents 
positive examples of co-management systems 
of common property, much of it published by 
the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) . See section 6 .1 below .
Benefits from the commons are “notoriously under-
estimated due to their often non-monetarised 
nature” (ibid: 3), for example in terms of equitable 
access, promotion of local peace and cultural 
identity .23 In francophone West Africa for instance, 
common use is rarely seen as fulfi l l ing the 
requirement of ‘mise en valeur’ (meaning to be 
developed economically), which justifies protec-
tion of land (although the passing of pastoralist 
legislation is beginning to change this in some 
places as described in section 6 .3 below) .24 
While some common property regimes have 
survived because of the relative homogeneity 
of resource users and because there have been 
no outsiders interested in grabbing the resources, 
there are common property regimes which have 
survived in competition with other systems, for 
example the Dina in Mali and European mountain 
pastoral commons .25 Cotula et al (2005) explore 
what policy and legal frameworks exist to secure 
the commons against resource grabbing by elites . 
In so doing they recognise firstly that such frame-
works must reconcile competing resource uses – for 
example between pastoralists and agriculturalists 
– and secondly that the frameworks must enable 
negotiation between the communities and any 
private sector operators that are interested in using 
the resources in question . Key to achieving this is 
strengthening the negotiating power of the local 
communities by ensuring that they have secure 
resource tenure . It is also important that policy and 
legislative frameworks are accessible . ‘Designing 
mechanisms through which policy makers and 
legislators can learn from and build on these local 
processes (e.g. where development agencies 
have supported local resource users) is one of 
the key challenges confronting the commons in 
Africa’ (ibid: 7) . 
Despite the popular ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
argument and pressures to privatise land, custom-
ary mechanisms for managing the commons 
have proved resilient in many places . In some 
countries policies and legislation are now secur-
ing communal management and ownership, 
for example South Africa’s Communal Property 
Associations Act, through which communities can 
hold land in common, the Mozambique Land Act 
of 1997 that allows demarcation and registration 
of community lands, and in Scotland, the Land 
Reform Act of 2003 that gives communities the 
right to buy land if/ when it comes onto the market 
(Cotula et al, 2005) .
The challenges for common property regimes (and 
for communal forms of land tenure), identified by 
Cotula et al (2005) are the following:
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•	 How are ‘communities’ defined? They are rarely 
homogenous groups, but instead are differenti-
ated according to livelihood groups, power, 
gender, age, income . Also membership of user 
groups may be fluid and include non-resident 
groups e .g . transhumant pastoralists;
•	 What rights should be secured? Usually this 
relates to rights of access, management and 
use, but land tenure systems, often imported 
during the colonial era, tend to favour private 
ownership;
•	 How can greater tenure security be provided? 
Recognising customary rights and building on 
local practices are key ‘as they enable one 
to go beyond the chaotic superposition of 
different tenure regimes (statutory, customary 
or combinations of both) that characterise the 
commons in much of Africa’ (ibid: 5), including 
Darfur . Options range from the codification 
of customary law to more flexible ways of 
recognising customary rights and integrating 
them in the formal legal framework . This may 
mean a hybrid system that combines elements 
of customary and formal . But the authors make 
an important distinction between recognising 
customary rights, and uncritically endorsing 
traditional authorities which may be unaccount-
able, politicised and gender-blind .
Ahmed’s review of case studies in Sudan summa-
rises the relative advantages of common property 
rights as: 1) they accommodate environmental 
uncertainty, 2) they are often more equitable 
and social than private property rights, as com-
munity participation and exchange is greater, and 
3) they are flexible and therefore potentially useful 
in contexts of multiple land use . On the other 
hand they suffer from the following disadvantages: 
1) difficulty of exclusion 2) difficulty of monitor-
ing and sanctioning, 3) limited incentive for 
individuals to invest, with resulting limited efficiency 
(Ahmed, 2010:18) .
A livestock migration route on the bank of the Ewaso Ng’iro in Samburu, Northern Kenya. The route on the 
right bank is more heavily grazed than the area off the route on the far side of the river. The area is managed 
collectively under the new laws that have been developed for Kenya’s arid areas.
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4.1  The three pillars of 
Sustainable Development 
and Peace
The links between sustainability, development and 
peace are an area of vigorous debate amongst 
decision-makers and commentators on Darfur . 
Both the core concepts of sustainable develop-
ment and the way they have been established in 
global environmental governance have relevance 
for national and local level environmental 
governance . The 1992 Rio Declaration highlights 
that “peace, development and environmental 
protection are interdependent and indivisible”26 
endorsing the analysis of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development’s27 report ’Our 
Common Future’ (1987) . These two documents 
are foundational to the on-going development of 
international governance and of national govern-
ance across the world . The report acknowledges 
that “Environmental stress is seldom the only cause 
of major conflicts within or among nations” but 
makes the link between peace and development 
by starting with the now well-known and widely 
accepted definition of sustainable development:
Sustainable development is development 
that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs .
This starting point takes the notion of continuity 
and frames it with respect to the competing 
needs of groups of people now and in the future, 
linked by the fact they depend on the same 
natural resources . If a group exceeds the carrying 
capacity28 of resources they depend on, then 
these resources will not be available for future 
generations . Therefore they assert:
At a minimum, sustainable development must 
not endanger the natural systems that support 
life on Earth: the atmosphere, the waters, the 
soils, and the living beings .
In terms of rights this is referred to as intergenera-
tional equity . However, the commission took this 
Sustainability, Development and Peace4
An abandoned farm near the river Nile at Sabaloga. The intensive farming of this area caused a decline in soil 
fertility, so the land has now reverted to desert and can no longer be usefully used for agriculture. 
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further in terms of its implications for rights of groups 
at the given time:
Even the narrow notion of physical sustain-
ability29 implies a concern for social equity 
between generations, a concern that must 
logically be extended to equity within each 
generation .
This step creates the link between sustainability, 
natural resources and peace . At the centre is 
the notion of social equity in the use of shared 
resources . Thus emerge the “ three pillars of 
sustainable development” – balancing social 
equity or rights, economic concerns (the efficient 
exploitation of resources) and environment . These 
are referred to as the three Es (Equity, Economic 
efficiency, Environment) . 
The importance of this balance is illustrated when 
contrasted with unsustainable practices . For 
example, a failure to recover costs makes a project 
economically unsustainable; excessive pollution 
or over abstraction of resources makes it envi-
ronmentally unsustainable; and both economic 
and environmental impacts can render it socially 
inequitable – a third form of unsustainability . 
Balancing the three Es is particularly challenging in 
contexts such as Darfur, where there is a scarcity 
both of environmental and financial resources . 
The balance of social equity becomes all the 
more sensitive if there is so little margin for error in 
resource use and in economic viability of initiatives . 
A lack of social equity is clearly a trigger for conflict . 
Our Common Future does not talk in terms of 
an inelastic relationship between the carrying 
capacity of natural resources and the population 
supported . In particular it discusses how technology 
and ‘organisation’ can influence how productively 
resources can be used . Good governance relates 
to Brundtland’s concept of ‘organisation’ and can 
be seen as enhancing the prospects for sustain-
able development . 
This is highly relevant to how the transition from 
a humanitarian to recovery or development 
framework is designed, as well as to initiatives 
relating to resource use and peace . “Water for 
peace” is a familiar slogan in Darfur . However, the 
initiatives have often tended to focus on assets 
(e .g . “10,000 wells for Darfur”30) with less attention 
on arrangements for good governance that are 
key to peace and to sustainable development . 
4.2  Building governance 
– national and global 
parallels
Brundtland was clear in that the reason a 
set of principles was needed that addressed 
environment and development was because of 
increasing resource competition: 
National and international law is being rapidly 
outdistanced by the accelerating pace and 
expanding scale of impacts on the ecological 
basis of development . Governments now 
need to fill major gaps in existing national and 
international law related to the environment . 
(par 97)
This resonates with the context in Sudan, particularly 
Darfur . As quoted in the introduction to this report, 
the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur calls for the 
development of “a framework for equitable access 
by various users of land and water resources” . The 
development of the international process (see 
Box 4) therefore has parallels with a similar process 
needed in Darfur (and underway in parts, although 
not well coordinated) and elsewhere in Sudan . 
These include:
1.  An overarching cycle of analysis, 
consultation, consensus and commitment 
builds the regulatory framework for 
participatory environmental governance.
A shared process (Wor ld Commiss ion on 
Environment and Development 1982-1987) tabled 
a contextual analysis, rationale and framework for 
response and a set of draft principles for consulta-
tion (‘Our Common Future’) . This consultation took 
place between 1987 and 1992 and culminated 
in the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 
at which the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development was endorsed comprising a modi-
fied version of the principles tabled in 1987 . This 
declaration is reproduced in Annex 1 . International 
political commitment was reflected in the three 
legally binding conventions that came as a result 
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Box 4. Multilateral Environmental Agreements31 – Milestones to Rio +20
1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment. Stockholm, UNEP established.
1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) adopted – 
Over 30,000 species protected.
1982 The Montevideo Programme adopted by UNEP Governing Council setting priorities for global law-making. This 
led to major agreements, including the Basel Convention on the Trans-boundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal (1989; 178 states), Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (2001, 176 parties, 
18 chemicals listed targeted for elimination) and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(1987). These conventions set common principles that have been widely adopted into national legal frameworks.
1983 The World Commission on Environment and Development established by UN General Assembly. Created 
the most prevalent definition of sustainable development. In 1987 commission published “Our Common Future” – a 
blue print for future work on sustainability. 
1988 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Publishes comprehensive and updated information 
on the scientific basis of climate change.
1991 Business Charter on Sustainable Development issued at the 2nd World Industry Conference on 
Environmental Management (WICEM II). Foundational meeting for business and environment links.
1991 Global Environment Facility (GEF) established. (182 member states, $57 billion support to 2,800 projects 
in more than 168 countries, $634 million direct grants to over 13,000 community-based projects).
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) adopts Rio Declaration and Agenda 
21. Set the course for contemporary sustainable development. Landmark treaties on climate change, desertification 
and biodiversity. 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) established. 193 member states. Protected areas doubled over 
past 20 years, covering over 12% of Earth’s land surface. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2000. Nagoya Protocol 
on access and benefit sharing in 2010. 
1994 International Conference on Population and development – Cairo
1994 Climate Change Convention entered into force, with 195 member states. Developing countries establish 
institutions for reporting progress on national adaptation programmes.
1995 Fourth World Conference for Women – establishes the Beijing Platform for Action undermining gender 
equity in Sustainable development.
1995 World Summit for Social Development
1996 UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) entered into force. 193 signatories. 42 African National 
Action Programmes. Two thirds of African countries implementing National Forest Programmes (NFPs). Sudan has 
a National Action Plan and a regional programme exists with IGAD.
1999 UN Global Compact launched. Over 8500 signatories from 135 countries working on sustainable and socially 
responsible policies. 
1997 Kyoto protocol adopted – It sets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European community 
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Funding to developing countries through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM).
2000 Millennium Declaration adopted: “ensuring environmental sustainability” as one of eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development – Johannesburg – Rio+10.
2005 Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity-building 
2005 Kyoto protocol comes into force. 
2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment highlights the importance of ecosystems to human well-being, and the 
extent of ecosystem decline. 
2007 Fourth IPCC Assessment Report states that warming of the climate is unequivocal. IPCC awarded the 2007 
Nobel Peace Prize. 
2007 The Economics of Ecosystems & Biodiversity (TEEB) launched Spotlights global economic benefits of 
biodiversity and ecosystems and multitrillion dollar losses being sustained by unsustainable path. 
2007 International Panel for Sustainable Resource Management Governments are urged to adopt policies to 
‘decouple’ the use of natural resources from economic development. 
2008 UN-REDD programme launched to combat deforestation, forest degradation and climate change. 42 partner 
countries. 14 national REDD programmes. 
2008 Launch of the Global Green New Deal – Green Economy. Transformational solution to both the economic 
crisis and environmental challenges. National policy initiatives in 15 countries. 
2012 Rio+20. Green Economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication key theme for 
the conference.
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of the conference: the framework convention on 
limate 
change (UNFCCC); the convention on biological 
diversity (CBD) and two years later the convention 
to combat desertification (UNCCD) . The Rio 
Declaration has continued to underpin subsequent 
development of multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEA) .32 
Particular effort is made to include marginal-
ised groups in these consultations . In the Rio 
Declaration, Principle 20 draws attention to the 
role of women, 21 to the role of youth and 22 to 
the role of indigenous people .
Supporting the emergence of co-management 
practices requires a similar diversity of activities to 
build consensus amongst stakeholders including 
government and resources users and then develop 
and implement functional resource management . 
Including the voice of marginalised groups is vital 
in reducing inequity in resource use .
2.  Building consensual environmental 
governance is an on-going process rather 
than a state to be achieved. Creating space 
for the dialogue needed for consensus to 
emerge is an important prerequisite for 
progress – in reality progress is uneven with 
external events creating opportunities, 
challenges and the need for ongoing 
adaptation. 
Brundtland’s report was prepared during the Cold 
War and the threat of nuclear disaster hangs over 
the document, making the appeal within it an 
urgent one . However, five years later the Cold War 
had ended and the UNCED took place in a climate 
of political and social optimism . There was a sense 
that joint international efforts could bring about real 
change and that environmental concerns and 
development could really be linked, underpinning 
the concept of sustainable development (Conca, 
2005) . There was a departure from speaking about 
the environment in abstract global terms at the 
highest level, instead recognizing its importance for 
An informal gold refining camp in Mahaliya Delgo in Northern State. Artisanal gold mining has attracted large 
numbers of workers from across Sudan, often to remote locations. The miners have established their own 
ways of working to share the profits and risks from the work. These informal systems, whilst enabling local 
collaboration have some significant weaknesses, such as the failure to control the use of mercury. 
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livelihoods and poverty alleviation at the grassroots 
level . By contrast in 2012, the level of ambition at 
the second UNCED conference “Rio +20” was 
much more constrained with a backdrop of a 
major economic downturn .33 Since development 
of governance takes time and circumstances 
change during the process, development and 
adaptation of institutions and policies are therefore 
likely to be concurrent . 
Darfur’s recovery therefore should not be expected 
to be linear, but combined with on-going adapta-
tion to climate shocks and wider social and political 
dynamics . Building co-management at the most 
local level requires time and an acceptance that 
progress will be uneven .
3.  Development of environmental governance 
across sectors can be variable creating a 
challenge for coordination. 
The broad scope of environmental governance 
creates a particular challenge for coordination 
– and considerable benefits if complementarity 
of action can be achieved . A clear articulation 
of principles promotes this as there will be some 
alignment at the strategic level . For example, if the 
forestry and water sectors both work on the basis 
of ecosystems management then there will be an 
enhanced natural alignment of programmes .34 
Strategic coordination is strengthened for inter-
national environmental governance through the 
Montevideo Programme for the Development 
and Periodic Review of Environmental Law, a 
rolling ten year programme operating since 1982 
coordinated by UNEP . The programme sets out 
objectives for the following decade . In Sudan 
the Higher Council for Environment and Natural 
Resources has the mandate for coordination 
across government; councils exist in some states 
but not all . 
Consultations and other participatory processes 
also promote coordination where the voice of 
each group of resource users is heard, enabling 
a holistic approach to the management of the 
environment . However, challenges still exist, for 
example aligning IWRM catchment management 
approaches in the same area as group ranching . 
In these cases one set of resource users (e .g . the 
group ranchers) may have a disproportionate 
voice with respect to a resource (e .g . water) as 
they have better networks than other users of the 
resources who are not part of the ranching network .
4.  Technical and scientific work is needed to 
provide a sound foundation for dialogue, 
and these need to be supported with 
effective communication 
In 2007 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded 
jointly to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change35 (IPCC) and Al Gore “for their efforts to 
build up and disseminate greater knowledge 
about man-made climate change, and to lay 
the foundations for the measures that are needed 
to counteract such change”36 . The IPCC is an 
intergovernmental body with 195 member states 
set up “to provide the world with a clear scientific 
view on the current state of knowledge in climate 
change and its potential environmental and socio-
economic impacts” . The IPCC produces updates 
assessments on climate change every 5 years 
and represents an unprecedented collaboration 
across the global scientific community . Al Gore 
took climate messaging to a popular audience 
with his film “An Inconvenient Truth” . The joint Nobel 
Prize recognises the need for both technical and 
popular communication as a foundation for 
peace . Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration calls 
for individuals to have access to information 
concerning the environment in order to enable 
participation .
UNEP’s Post Conflict Environmental Assessments37 
and associated analytical follow-up are designed 
to be an analytical platform for rebuilding environ-
mental governance in post conflict contexts . In 
Darfur a number of reports have been produced 
(such as this one) that provide environmental 
analysis that could support the Darfur Internal 
Dialogue and Consultation mandated in the DDPD . 
Co-management regimes draw on technical 
environmental data (e .g . groundwater data 
published by government) and on community 
based data collection (such as participatory rural 
appraisals (PRA)) . 
5.  Civil society organisations are important 
as a voice that builds consensus and 
outlasts shorter term planning timeframes 
and institutional agendas. 
Part of the strength of UNCED was the large-scale 
and coordinated participation of civil society 
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groups . Their contribution endorsed the sense 
in which the event reflected a genuine global 
consensus . Twenty years later civil society groups 
continued to provide an ambitious voice for the 
environment notwithstanding the less optimistic 
political and economic climate .
In Sudan the Environmentalists’ Society was 
formed largely from staff and students at the 
Khartoum University Institute of Environmental 
Sciences, and both organisations were active 
in lobbying for the establishment of the Higher 
Council for Environment and Natural Resources . 
The Sudanese Environmental Conservation Society 
complements this role with a wide network of 
environmental groups taking action across Sudan . 
Civil society in Sudan38 has played a constructive 
role providing technical expertise and providing 
a bridge between community action and various 
aspects of national dialogue . Co-management 
draws on the strengths of civil society in resource 
management forums, whether it is traditional 
leadership, community based organisations 
or non-governmental organisations . There is 
an important role for academic institutions in 
providing technical support and monitoring for 
co-management processes .
6.  Since flows in money and flows in natural 
resources are inherently linked, managing 
the economics of the environment is 
essential to managing the environment. 
Economic controls are a means of regulating 
activities with respect to the environment . Principle 
16 calls for the “internalisation of environmental 
costs” with respect to pollution – the polluter pays . 
This principle has been further developed under 
the “green economy” benefits as well as costs from 
the environment . If the value of services provided 
by an ecosystem can be reflected economically 
then the case can be made for resources to be 
provided for the maintenance of that ecosystem . 
The green economy was one of the two main 
themes of the Rio +20 Summit . 
Analysis of economic flows has been important in 
understanding the environmental challenges dur-
ing the crisis . UNEP’s report “Destitution, Distortion 
and Deforestation” showed how the distorted 
crisis economy in Darfur was driving deforestation 
through the inflated construction sector as a result 
of the international presence in Darfur . This made 
the case for introducing alternative construction 
technology in the humanitarian programme . This 
Traders in an informal gold refining camp in Mahaliya Dalgo, Northern State. Understanding resource 
economics is vital to identifying means to governing exploitation and use of natural resources.
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analysis provides a basis to better manage the 
environmental externalities of aid spending . 
7. Reforming environmental governance 
requires funding at international, national 
and local levels.
The Global Environment Facility was established in 
1991 to support implementation of the initiatives 
coming out of the Rio +20 Summit . At national 
level, budgets must be allocated for environmental 
developments . Similarly, in contexts of co-man-
agement, the establishment of revolving funds 
can be the key enabling factor for new processes 
of community environmental management . 
Mutually reinforcing benefits can be obtained by 
designing complimentary micro-finance initiatives 
for livelihoods and participatory natural resource 
management .
8. International development practice 
provides an opportunity for the 
demonstration of sustainable development 
principles. 
Well-designed aid projects that implement 
Environmental Impact Assessments, consultations 
and other aspects of best practice in environmen-
tal governance while ensuring their own projects 
are environmentally sound, can also create a local 
precedent for implementation of these important 
environmental measures . Conversely, develop-
ment projects that are poorly implemented may 
model shortcuts or poor practice that also set 
precedents, this time undermining capacity build-
ing for environmental best practice . Community 
based natural resource management also 
includes analysis of potentially negative impacts 
in project planning for local resource use . See 
Principle 17 in the Rio Declaration .
9. Capacity building of new and existing 
institutions is needed to implement 
sustainable development objectives. 
Capacity building is also needed for groups 
to negotiate new environmental agreements.
Governance requires institutions . UNEP was 
established in 1972 as a result of the Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment . In 1988 
UNEP and the World Meteorological Organisation 
established the IPCC, which led intergovernmental 
analysis of climate change and provided the 
platform for the Kyoto protocol . The institutional 
context continues to evolve . 
Similarly, at national level, the development of 
an appropriate institutional context is vital for the 
implementation of environmental governance . 
The Rio Declaration recognises this in principle 9 
calling for cooperation on endogenous capacity 
building .39 Training in negotiation is important 
in international agreements and may also be 
significant in the development of national and 
local institutions .
10. Economic and political impediments 
may undermine the translation of 
commitment into action
Despite the developments and the optimism of the 
early 1990s, action on translating the conventions 
into national and local action has been slow and 
inconsistent . Swiderska40 includes the following 
reasons for weak implementation, for which 
parallels exist in national and local processes of 
reform .
•	 little practical demonstration of the value of 
the conventions to various national and sub-
national contexts, for example the Convention 
on Biological Diversity focusing on the conser-
vation of rare species of global importance 
with little demonstration of relevance to local 
priorities and livelihoods;
•	 responsibility for implementation of conventions 
allocated to departments which are often 
underfunded and under-resourced, within 
peripheral, sectoral ministries; 
•	 financial mismanagement and an elite capture 
of funds, which do not trickle down to local level; 
the view of economic and trade departments 
that national economic development would 
be hampered by strengthened environmental 
governance41, and that international agree-
ments on the environment are secondary to 
free trade agreements; and 
•	 lack of structural changes needed to improve 
natural resource management .
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4.3  Emerging environmental 
governance in dryland 
Darfur
Dryland ecosystems comprise approximately 
two thirds of Sudan . Water is a limiting factor for 
growth in vegetation and in social and economic 
activity in these contexts . Counter-intuitively, water 
development in drylands brings risks as well as ben-
efits – it’s not always the most appropriate action . 
Developing a water point may lead to depletion of 
the aquifer, or to depletion of other resources such 
as rangeland . Therefore water interventions need 
particular attention so that the economic social 
and environmental aspects of life and livelihoods 
in these interventions are kept in balance (Nassef 
and Belayhun, 2012; Gomes, 2006) . Traditional 
livelihoods have developed to harness the variable 
and unpredictable distribution of resources – such 
as migrating to maximise livestock productivity by 
feeding on the more nutritious recently rain-fed 
pastures .42 Appropriate support, however, to 
enable holistic and integrated approaches to 
drylands, draws on both indigenous and innovative 
best practice . Government, traditional leadership 
and community based management all have 
relevance in Sudan’s drylands . Significant chal-
lenges to establishing equitable governance exist, 
but there are also some promising initiatives .
FAO undertook a review of the provision of water 
points for pastoralists in Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Somalia, which found that providing permanent 
water points, whilst providing abundance of one 
resource, attracted populations that meant other 
resources declined . “Grazing around the new 
water points, especially boreholes, transformed 
areas into dry grazing grounds… .localised over-
grazing expanded, and more important, perennial 
palatable plants began to disappear…” This led 
to considerable health and social problems . “The 
reduced quality of pastures affects milk yield 
and has important health consequences . This is 
suspected to increase vulnerability to famine and 
malnutrition . In some instances, the longer separa-
tion of the household from its herds has weakened 
children’s health status as they are deprived from 
regular provision of milk” (Fratkin and al, 1999) .
In Darfur the humanitarian funding in the water 
sector has had a remarkable impact in sustaining 
the lives of around two million displaced people .43 
However, the provision of large amounts of good 
quality, free water in a dryland ecosystem has 
challenges for the longer term transition to a 
sustainable context in which water is available yet 
is within the boundaries of what the environment 
and the economy can sustain . Co-management 
regimes have an advantage in localising decision 
making on prioritising trade-offs between the 
three Es . This should not, however, downplay the 
importance of government investment . 
Management of ecosystems is also an important 
strategy, promoting equity through the manage-
ment of water for all users . Integrated Water 
Resources Management, is an ecosystems 
based44 approach applied at the wadi catchment 
level and is built on the four Dublin Principles . 
Box 5. Dublin Principles  
for Integrated Water 
Resources Management
1)  Fresh Water is a finite and vulnerable resource, 
essential to sustain life, development and the 
environment;
2)  Water development and management should 
be based on a participatory approach, involving 
users, planners, and policy-makers at all levels; 
3)  Women play a central part in the provision, 
management, and safeguarding of water; 
4)  Water has an economic value in all its competing 
uses and should be recognized as an economic 
good.
There is growing endorsement of IWRM in Darfur 
in the context of an approach that demonstrates 
many of the threads of emerging environmental 
governance described above . Technical studies, 
undertaken by different water sector stakehold-
ers, confirmed the need for greater attention 
to water resource management .45 As part of a 
vision-building exercise UNEP hosted two study 
tours to South Africa which formed the basis for 
vision documents . More widespread endorsement 
of an environmental agenda was articulated 
at the El Fasher Climate Change workshop in 
March 2010 .46 The IWRM and climate vision 
statements have been reflected in priorities in 
Darfur’s planning documents such as the UN’s 
Beyond Emergency Relief, Darfur International 
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A small wadi or khorr in North Darfur. Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is an approach 
in which water is managed in a holistic way in the context of other natural resources within the same wadi 
catchment. This khorr is part of the wadi El Ku catchment.
Box 6. Water rights and water resources in dry-land Darfur
Humanitarian water programming in Darfur has made considerable progress in lifesaving activities in a complex 
operating environment. However, after nine years, it is now proving difficult to identify an end-game for “emergency” 
practices that focus on only one of the three pillars of sustainable development – rights – without comparable 
attention to the others: economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. There are, for example, few initiatives 
for cost recovery and aquifers are still being widely over-abstracted.
IDPs in camps are entitled to 15 litres of water per person per day47 which is generally acknowledged as being 
more than they had before the crisis when they were dispersed across the region. As a result there has been an 
unprecedented draw down of aquifers with water tables down by 7-10 metres in some camps. UNEP has classified 
23 camps as at risk of failing resources (UNEP 2008A). One of these has already run dry. 
An assessment in 2007 found that IDPs were using around half of the water supplied for sale to the city nearby 
or for making bricks that were also sold to the city (Oxfam 2007). The water sold in the city was comparatively 
expensive and was no longer clean after transport in donkey carts to the town. The bricks were feeding the property 
boom created by the international presence in Darfur. This increased trade in bricks was cited by Darfuri traders 
as the major cause of deforestation in Darfur during the crisis as increasing quantities of woodfuel was needed to 
fire the brick kilns (UNEP, 2008B).
So, chlorinated water that was being provided for free, funded by international organisations, was to a significant 
extent being used to subsidise a brick industry that was both causing environmental damage to water resources 
through the depletion of the aquifers, as well as damaging forestry resources through the increased demand for 
firewood. Paradoxically, the increased demand for the brick industry came from the very presence of the international 
organisations, some of whom were also funding the free water. 
For the water sector in Darfur, this enduring focus on rights – to the exclusion of economic efficiency and 
environmental sustainability – has had long term consequences in what is both a distorted economy and a vulnerable 
ecosystem. Not least, it creates a considerable challenge in the re-establishment of a water sector that reflects a 
balanced approach to the three pillars of sustainable development.
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Water Conference and the Darfur Joint Assessment 
Mission . Implementation has been promoted as 
GWWD and WES and Oxfam introduced monitoring 
to the humanitarian response in 2007 and com-
munity based “IWRM-light” initiatives . The Ministry 
of Agriculture in South Darfur has taken up the 
catchment approach . The EU is working with UNEP 
and others on the development of a major catch-
ment project for Wadi El Ku . More recently, a similar 
process on dryland management with a focus on 
rangelands has emerged with a successful study 
tour and consultation in late 2012 .
The humanitarian response in Darfur has caused 
the UN to develop new approaches to integrating 
environmental concerns into humanitarian work 
plans and the consolidated appeals process . 
The screening of humanitarian work plans, the 
development of an environmental marker for 
projects, and a four stage process for projects 
to Contextualise, Assess, Mitigate environmental 
impacts and Enhance environmental benefits 
have been at the core of this approach .48 A tem-
plate for Environmental and Social Screening has 
been developed for projects that are larger, yet 
still not large enough to warrant a full EIA . These 
approaches warrant scale up and integration with 
wider recovery programming in dryland Darfur . 
The increasing attention being given to the 
concept of resilience has potential to address 
some of the more challenging aspects of the 
transition from an exclusive focus on rights in which 
economy and environment are not given due 
attention on an “emergency” rationale to one of 
sustainable development . Building resilience puts 
greater emphasis on enabling communities to 
prepare for and respond to crises . It has a longer 
timeframe than humanitarian projects, pays more 
attention to creating an enabling environment 
and to capacity-building, and has greater 
potential to be cost effective because it builds 
self-reliance . The development of sustainable and 
equitable environmental governance in Darfur 
remains an overarching challenge . Yet these 
initiatives – and others like them – demonstrate 
that progress has been made and can be built 
upon and replicated .
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5.1 Introduction
Land tenure is central to environmental govern-
ance and often one of its most disputed issues . 
Land tenure refers to the relationships between 
and among people with respect to land, whether 
defined legally (by statute) or customarily (infor-
mally) (FAO 2007) . Much of the literature on land 
tenure emphasises the multiple dimensions of 
land . Whereas modern institutions of government 
are likely to focus on its economic significance, 
traditional institutions may have a very different 
understanding; it has strong political, social, 
cultural and spiritual significance as well, and 
central to this is the inter-generational dimension .49
Land tenure tends to reflect the power structure 
in a society:
Because land and other natural resources 
are central to social and cultural identity and 
economic wealth, tenure arrangements in a 
society develop in a manner that entrenches 
the power relations between and among 
individuals and social groups . Tenure thus has 
enormous political implications and tenure 
issues are liable to be politicised . (FAO, 2009:5)
As Clover (2007: 4) reminds us: “land is an asset of 
substantial value and control over this resource is 
often central to national and local power” .
Land tenure is a vast and complex topic . This 
section focuses specifically on two aspects: how 
customary land tenure systems are changing and 
adapting in Africa, with particular reference to 
the Sahel; and post conflict implications for land 
tenure . A number of authors lament how land 
issues are often ignored by international agencies 
because of the complexity and perceived political 
risks associated with land . This is true of the devel-
opment side, for example donor governments 
Land Tenure5
Traditional land use in Darfur. At the end of the rainy season there is extensive vegetation and water is still 
widely available in river beds. In the dry season the vegetation will have dried significantly and water may 
only available from deep wells re-dug each year in the river bed.
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skirting around land issues which have received 
inadequate attention in PRSPs (IIED et al, 2005), 
and also to the humanitarian side:
Despite increasing evidence that land is often 
a critical issue in conflict-affected emergen-
cies and forced displacement and plays 
a key role in post-conflict reintegration and 
reconstruction processes, there is a perceived 
lack of humanitarian engagement on housing, 
land and property issues . (Pantuliano, 2009:1)
Yet the outcome of a ‘Land in Africa’ conference, 
held by IIED in 2005, reminds us that:
Secure land rights are now recognised by most 
African governments as critical for peace, 
stability and economic growth . The African 
Union also sees better governance of land 
and natural resources as central to all hopes 
of peace and stability across the continent . 
(IIED et al, 2005: 3)
5.2  Customary land tenure 
and its evolution in Africa
Cotula (2006) charts how customary land tenure 
systems are changing across Africa as the 
continent undergoes major transformation due 
to processes such as urbanisation, population 
pressure, diversifying of livelihoods and the arrival 
of new investors in land . Monetarisation of the 
economy and agricultural intensification have 
sometimes accelerated the decline of customary 
systems . This is in line with the ‘evolutionary theory 
of land rights’, whereby the combined effects of 
demographic growth and changes in cropping 
systems, including increased production of cash 
crops, increases the value of land and leads to the 
greater individualisation of land rights and a more 
monetarised/ privatised land tenure system, but this 
rarely happens in a linear and straightforward way .
The current diversity of approaches to land man-
agement in Africa is captured in Afrobarometer’s 
study . Answers to the question “Who do you think 
actually has primary responsibility for managing 
each of the following tasks? Is it the central govern-
ment, the local government, traditional leaders, or 
members of your community: allocating land?” 
are shown in Figure 2 .
Cotula (2007) captures some of the different ways 
in which customary land tenure systems adapt and 
are reinterpreted as a result of social, economic, 
political and cultural change according to the local 
context . In some cases, customary authorities have 
maintained or even strengthened their power, for 
example through strategic alliances with central 
government authorities and business elites . In others 
they have been eroded by demographic change 
in the local population, competition from formal 
government institutions, and by shifting power 
dynamics . Where customary authorities are still 
effective in regulating land access, the collegiate 
bodies that are used to oversee their work may not 
be, resulting in a breakdown in accountability and 
a privatisation of common lands . 
However, whereas government policy used to 
emphasise replacing ‘customary’ with ‘modern’ 
Figure 2.  Role of Traditional Leaders versus Local Government in Allocating Land  
(primary responsibility) in 18 countries.
Source: Logan (2011)
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tenure systems, this is giving way to a growing 
recognition that land policies and laws must build 
on local practice (Cotula, 2007) . Ways of doing 
so are captured in Box 7 . Kenya’s Land Policy of 
2007 – the first since independence – is a good 
example (Ministry of Lands, 2007) . It recognises 
and protects customary rights to land, formally 
recognising community land for the first time . It also 
makes provisions to secure pastoralist livelihoods 
and rights to land . The emphasis is on governance 
at the local level with three key institutions: district 
offices of the National Land Commission (to be 
staffed by technical representatives who are 
appointed), District Land Boards (composed of 
democratically elected community representa-
tives) and Community Land Boards (comprising 
elected representatives of people resident in 
the area, to respect ethnic diversity, gender etc) . 
In Niger the Rural Code process introduced 
‘Commissions Foncières’ that operate at the 
village level and function in a similar way . Their 
mandate is:
1 . the provision of information and awareness-
raising about land regulation,
2 . to collect and manage information on land 
purchases and;
3 . ensuring security of tenure and land titles 
through registration of land transactions
This has contributed to reducing antagonism 
between different groups in the rural population 
and reinforcing the security of land purchases, 
which is especially important for those with less 
political power (Kandine Adam, 2006) .
The term legal pluralism is commonly used to 
describe separate social fields of legality that 
overlap and interact . Such situations are common 
across Africa, where land holding is complex and 
fluid and several legal systems may operate at 
once (Clover, 2007) . 
An instructive example of legal pluralism in which 
customary and statutory frameworks co-exist 
or – more accurately – are intertwined, is that of 
south-western Burkina Faso . Migration into the area 
from other parts of the country and from Côte 
d’Ivoire, the expansion of cultivated lands for cot-
ton (replacing subsistence crops) and greater use 
of animal traction for cultivation mean that land 
is now in short supply . A monetised but somewhat 
chaotic land market has emerged that is not 
cut-off from its customary roots . For example, it is 
not clear-cut what is being purchased, the land 
Box 7. A way forward for Government Policy on Land Tenure
Where customary systems have been eroded by social, economic, cultural and political change, government 
intervention may be needed to provide effective land management. Even where customary systems seem to work 
well at the local level, government intervention may be required as powerful outsiders that do not feel bound by 
those systems (e.g. urban elites, foreign investors) enter the land arena. In these cases, lack of legal protection for 
local land rights based on customary systems may result in local resource users losing land access. And whether 
customary systems are still working well or not, government intervention may be needed to secure the resource 
claims of weaker and more vulnerable groups – who stand to lose out in ongoing processes of change in local 
land relations
Recent emphasis on the need for legislation to build on local practice is a major step forward compared to the 
past. Ongoing debates on the formalisation of land rights (which tend to be centred on individual land registration 
programmes) must avoid the trap of appealing but simplistic one-size-fits-all solutions. Where resource access rights 
are multiple and overlapping, as is the case in much of rural Africa, registering individual property rights would raise 
important technical and political challenges, and would entail that unregistered right holders lose access to vital 
resources. Therefore, legislation that aims to secure resource claims based on locally recognised tenure systems, 
rather than to overhaul them is, in many cases, the most effective way to secure access to natural resources.
In this, temptations to idealise the “local” must be resisted. Many customary systems are inequitable as regards 
social status, age, gender and other aspects. This raises the challenge of finding ways to ‘square the circle’ [meaning 
to find resolution] of recognising and securing local land rights, which are the entitlements through which most 
rural people gain access to land; while avoiding entrenching inequitable power relations and unaccountable local 
institutions.
Cotula (2007: 3-4)
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itself or the right to cultivate it, and monetised 
transactions occur within an established system of 
social obligations: thus, incomers buying land may 
be tied by a ‘duty of gratitude’ to their hosts who are 
selling it, and this may be more onerous because 
of the monetised payment . Also, transactions are 
often concealed, rarely accompanied by legal 
proof of transfer, and land is still rarely thought of 
as a commodity . Although a market is emerging, 
it is still not talked about as its practices violate 
customary principles of land tenure and land 
legislation (Chaveau and Colin, 2006) . The authors 
of this study in Burkina Faso challenge the view that 
once a land market has emerged it continues to 
operate indefinitely, citing an example from Côte 
d’Ivoire where incomers initially acquired land on 
the market, but as it has passed from generation to 
generation and as land has become increasingly 
scarce with the introduction of new cash crops, 
there has been a reining in of land sales which 
have now become a family, not an individual mat-
ter . Meanwhile in Sudan, “the customary system is 
too often separated from the formal system – rather 
than being viewed as part of the justice sector for 
Sudan”, despite the fact that access to justice for 
80 to 100% of the population is through customary 
law (Boyd et al, 2007: 33) . 
Women’s access to land in customary land tenure 
systems varies greatly from one context to another, 
although Daley and Mi-young Park (2011) observe 
that:
In relation to gender, women in many societies 
acquire rights to land – often secondary 
usufruct rights – by means of their relationship 
with men (fathers, husbands, brothers, sons) . 
Particularly in Africa, women often lose land 
on widowhood and become vulnerable to 
eviction from their matrimonial homes . (p .15)
However, the authors also recognise that evolving 
customary land tenure practices and institutions 
have a potentially important role to play in 
promoting a more gender-equitable land tenure 
system, especially where women find it easier to 
approach local leaders and customary institutions 
than legislative bodies .
View across Aribo and Wadi Azoum to Zalingei at the end of the rainy season. Azoum is one of Darfur’s 
largest watercourses. Flooding is still apparent in the brickworks on the bank but by this stage the wadi bed 
has run dry.
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5.3  Land, conflict, and post-
conflict experience
Alden Wily (2009) provides salutary evidence of the 
impact of tension and disputes around customary 
land rights in Africa: ‘among the 30-plus conflicts in 
African in 1990 and/ or since, there have been only 
three cases where this was not (often in hindsight) 
to prove a fundamental element in the grievances 
driving people to war and emerging out of war 
as a concrete target of remedy’ (ibid: 36) . This is 
often to do with the unclear status of customary 
land interests, especially in relation to state land, as 
demonstrated so clearly in Sudan, see Box 5 . As a 
result, millions of customary landholders around the 
world are seeking statutory legal recognition of their 
occupancy and use rights, with some promising 
examples, including innovations in family and 
collective entitlement in countries such as Mexico 
and Tanzania (ibid) .
Unruh (2009) draws attention to the way legal plural-
ism can proliferate during conflict . Informal legal 
fields usually move and evolve much more quickly 
than formal law . He warns that: ‘When difficulties 
between legal fields regarding land access, claim, 
use, disputes and security become widespread 
and severe over the course of a conflict, the 
result can threaten a delicate peace’ (ibid: 54) 
with examples from El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Mozambique . The informal legal fields that develop 
during war will usually be stronger than old or new 
laws, a salutary point for Darfur as the conflict 
continues with widespread displacement, some 
secondary occupation of land, and opportunistic 
arrangements around land to enable livelihoods to 
continue . Indeed, population displacement and 
dislocation can play a key role in the development 
of legal pluralism, through physical separation 
within communities which weakens social rights 
and obligations, and displaced people seeking 
land elsewhere through alternative land tenure 
arrangements related to the newly emerging 
situation . Whether the displaced can return ‘home’ 
will depend on various factors including the length 
of the war, the intactness of the return community 
and the extent to which individual and community 
changes during displacement are compatible 
with the pre-conflict tenure system . Land-related 
grievances can also encourage legal pluralism, 
which may be associated with a weak presence 
and penetration of the state in dealing with land 
issues and therefore the emergence of alternative 
mechanisms for resolving land disputes .
This description of legal pluralism resonates strongly 
with the current context in Darfur . The Darfur Land 
Commission (DLC) is currently undertaking a major 
land use mapping exercise in order to produce 
the “Darfur States Land Use Mapping Database” 
as described in the DDPD . This will be submitted 
to the Darfur Regional Authority for approval and 
updated every five years . In addition the DLC has 
undertaken a major exercise in documenting 
customary land management mechanisms . The 
DDPD mandates the DLC to arbitrate on land 
disputes (paragraph 201) . However, a role for 
traditional leadership remains (as described in 
paragraph 203) “…parties to land disputes shall 
be encouraged to exhaust traditional methods 
of dispute settlement, including arbitration, before 
going to court” . Therefore a system of legal plurality 
is built into the management of land in Darfur . 
Managing the interface between these systems will 
be key for ongoing progress of land management 
in Darfur .
Clover (2007) makes the point that land issues are 
fundamental to reconciliation and economic 
rehabilitation in most countries emerging from 
protracted conflicts:
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Office of the Darfur Land Commission (DLC) 
in Khartoum. The commission was established 
under the Darfur Peace Agreement. It draws on 
customary knowledge and more technical elements 
such as land use mapping with GIS for its work. 
Its mandate has been clarified under the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur.
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Governance of the tenure regime, access to 
land, security of tenure and distribution of land 
holdings provide the building blocks for sustain-
able security, but in post-conflict situations they 
are also more fluid and open than perhaps 
at any other time and the post-conflict period 
poses many operational tensions . (p . 83-84)
Although legislative change often accompanies 
a peace process, it is usually very slow compared 
with the much quicker and more fluid develop-
ments in the informal legal fields . This introduces 
the concept of ‘forum shopping’ where claimants 
are able to choose the legal field in which to pur-
sue land issues, for example formal law, customary 
systems, or even a perceived legal field associated 
with humanitarian organisations . Although messy, 
it has been argued that forum shopping can offer 
room for manoeuvre and negotiability, potentially 
reducing violence in a peace process (Lund, 1996) . 
Unruh (2009) points out how some forum shopping 
has evolved into a relationship between legal 
fields that operates as a form of appeal, citing 
the Somali Region in south-east Ethiopia where 
forms of dispute resolution have changed over 
time into a form of appeal, for example involving 
local elders or family courts . This can result in a 
realignment of fields to be sequential rather than 
several choices at once which can introduce a 
great deal of uncertainty . Unruh argues that state 
recognition of legal pluralism may be important in 
a peace process if the state emerging from civil 
war is weakened and/ or its legitimacy is question-
able, citing El Salvador’s Chapultepec peace 
agreement and the Mozambican peace accord 
as examples of state recognition of pluralism which 
contributed to success of the peace process .
Recognising the significance of numerous national 
level restitution processes – for example, the 
United Nations High Commission for Human Rights’ 
appointment of Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro as Special 
Rapporteur on Housing and Property Restitution 
in 2002 – led to the adoption of the Pinheiro 
Principles50 in 2005 . The principles are designed to 
provide practical guidance on the legal and tech-
nical issues of restitution of land and property . A 
handbook51 for their implementation was published 
in 2007 . The principles endorse numerous existing 
rights in the context of return and state that: “All refu-
gees and displaced persons have the right to have 
restored to them any housing, land or property of 
which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, 
or to be compensated for any housing, land or 
property that is factually impossible to restore as 
determined by an independent, impartial tribunal” . 
As Bruce notes in his 2007 review of the Rwandan 
return process52: in complex situations where more 
than one returnee appears to have rights to the 
same piece of land, application of the principles 
can be unclear . This example however serves as 
a useful reminder of principles and guidelines in 
general which need application with due regard 
to the context . 
Alden Wily (2009) lays out the risks of focussing only 
on restorative justice post-conflict, in other words 
the restitution of property to the displaced, often 
the focus of humanitarian actors . She makes the 
case for considering reform of property relations 
where these are at the heart of the conflict: “peace 
therefore becomes much less a matter of restoring 
the order than changing the order” (ibid: 35) . 
She usefully distinguishes between four types of 
property concerns in conflict:
1 . grievances that consciously triggered the 
conflict and therefore carry with them a victor’s 
or peace agenda relating to property . (An 
example of this in the Darfur conflict is the 
grievance held by the Northern Rizeygat about 
their lack of tribal land rights);
2 . those that appear during the war due to a 
breakdown in norms, rule of law and policies, 
especially because of displacement . (An 
example of this in Darfur is the grazing of 
pastoralist livestock on farms and in villages 
that have been abandoned by the displaced, 
and that are now semi-settled by pastoralists);
3 . property issues that arise or are heightened 
because of a poorly-managed peace . (For 
example, in Sudan the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement [CPA] failed to determine ownership 
of underground natural resources and parts 
of the boundary between North and South, 
contributing to the Abyei crisis in 2009 – Alden-
Wiley, 2009);
4 . inequitable property relations, often afflicting 
agrarian societies and that could result in 
further conflict if unresolved . (For example, 
customary land rights were never defined in 
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the CPA, leaving government plenty of room 
to fall back on the pre-war convention that 
customary property is restricted to residential 
and cultivation lands, and that it therefore 
retains legal power over the majority of land to 
be allocated to whomever it chooses, including 
investors) .
The last two in the list are the ones that are usually 
paid least attention . Alden Wiley (2009) also warns 
against the dangers of humanitarian, research and 
development agencies paying undue attention 
to the ownership of individual assets, especially in 
relation to the needs of the displaced, yet failing 
to understand that property relations are often 
community-based, with complex patterns of 
ownership and access:
For example, it is common for humanitarian 
actors to recommend that nomads be given 
ownership of pastures in circumstances where 
in fact their rights are historically rights of 
seasonal access, not ownership, and where 
state-supported abuse of those rights contrib-
uted to war in the first instance (as in Sudan, 
Afghanistan, Chad, Somalia and Ethiopia) . 
Alternatively, agencies may press for the 
immediate retrieval and re-entrenchment 
of registered entitlements as if these issues 
were not a source of contention and griev-
ance, or advocate titling without recognising 
precisely what should be registrable and by 
whom – including families, groups and whole 
communities . (p . 37)
Alden Wily (2009) warns that:
All too often, a great deal of damage is done 
to property relations in the first two years of 
peace as confused conditions reign and criti-
cal decisions not taken become more difficult 
as political will flags . The free-for-all impulse of 
the war years may continue . Land-grabbing 
Volcanic roots North-West of Jebel Marra in North Darfur. Various livelihood groups depend on access to the 
natural resources in this area at different parts of the year. Frameworks to manage these resources equitably 
are evolving and draw on both traditional and statutory forms of governance. The Doha Document for Peace 
in Darfur calls for these frameworks to be reformed. 
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is the commonest symptom and is difficult 
to undo . Thus far, peace accords, while 
more alert to property concerns, still largely 
fail to address the issue of tenure at all 
(Afghanistan, Liberia), fail to sufficiently prepare 
for long-known realities (Rwanda, Burundi), 
leave loopholes through which recalcitrant 
parties may clamber to avoid compliance with 
even principles they have agreed (Sudan, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala), or (almost 
always) fail to provide external monitoring with 
the teeth to discourage abuses .(p . 39)
A review of seven peace agreements across the 
African continent since the early 1990s demon-
strates how inadequately issues of land and natural 
resources are dealt with in the agreements . It also 
shows the problems that that inadequacy caused 
in the post-conflict phase in which a given new 
administration rarely has the interests of the poor 
rural population high on its agenda (see Annex 
2) . The Niger example in 1995 is perhaps one of 
the most promising, but was not followed up with 
successful implementation . 
Based on wide-ranging experience, Alden Wiley 
(2009) proposes strategies for dealing with land 
tenure in the peace process, summarised in Box 8 .
The Committee on World Food Security endorsed 
the ‘ Voluntary Guidel ines on Respons ible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests’ in May 2012 . (FAO, 2012) Facilitated by FAO, 
these are intended to ‘assist States, civil society and 
Box 8. Strategies for dealing with Land issues in Peace Processes
Get in early: ensure that land and property issues are placed high on the peacemaking agenda
Build up core expertise and tangible lessons: there is now adequate experience of post-conflict situations to 
know what to expect and to plan for, and sufficient experience of comparable issues in non-conflict states. The 
challenge is to ensure that this kind of analysis and advice (e.g. from land tenure experts) is taken on board by 
mediators and negotiating parties;
Use international power to best advantage while it counts: there is usually a short window of opportunity in 
which the post-conflict administration depends heavily on the international community for guidance and resources, 
and maximum advantage should be taken of this window as experience shows that rising self-interest on the part 
of a new administration may otherwise exacerbate the problem;
Focus upon the most pressing realities: there is a need to prioritise. Experience shows that there are often three 
key issues that require urgent attention (i) preparing for the consequences of rapid post-conflict urbanisation (ii) 
reforming the ways in which customary and common property resources are tenured; and (iii) pursuing these and 
other policy-making and action in a genuinely localised and inclusive manner;
Prepare for the ‘post-conflict city’: rapid urbanisation takes place during and post-conflict in most contexts. 
Pre-empting these trends is key, not with master planning and formalised programmes, but rather with programmes 
that focus on vulnerable sectors and actions that help them to secure rights at least cost and with greatest speed, 
and embedding land rights principles and commitments in early agreements;
Get to grips with the tenure status of natural resources and customary lands: this is particularly important 
in relation to the vulnerable status of unregistered rights, especially in areas where natural resources are attractive 
to agri-business investors post-conflict. Community definition of the boundaries of large communal properties is 
now being widely adopted as a practical local level strategy to protect customary rights to forest resources;
Pay attention to the powerful territorial notion of ‘our land’: failure to account for the persistence of this notion 
has exacerbated tensions in agrarian conflicted societies, e.g. Kenya. It relates to the wider issue of the status of 
the customary property interests, and where authority over this is vested. Devolution of land authority to the most 
local community level is a practical way of dealing with this;
Make popular empowerment the cornerstone of practical intervention: at a practical level, particularly in 
relation to agency involvement, projects need to be as devolved, participatory and experiential as possible. This 
can be done on a pilot basis, thus fostering inclusive and democratic governance and engaging civil society post 
conflict. This can also play an important role in dealing with local level conflict and contested rights;
Work with women: this may be particularly important in relation to urban property, as large numbers of widows and 
female-headed households often gather in poor urban areas; they are often an accessible and needy target group.
Alden Wiley (2009)
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the private sector in improving the governance of 
tenure, and thus contribute to alleviating hunger 
and poverty, empowering the poor and vulner-
able, enhancing the environment, supporting 
national and local economic development, and 
reforming public administration’, recognising that 
it is the poor who are particularly vulnerable to 
the consequences of weak governance affecting 
land tenure as they lack the ability to protect their 
rights to land and to other natural resources .53 
When finalised, these guidelines may be a useful 
resource for states emerging from conflict as 
they develop and refine strategies, policy and 
legislation related to land tenure . 
Box 9. Nuba Mountains
Historically farmers and migratory pastoralists in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan have shared access to natural 
resources through customary governance mechanisms. At specific times the pastoralists had the right to cross 
the farmers’ fields on agreed migratory routes. In the dry season they move southward along the migratory routes; 
in the rainy season the pastoralists travel northwards. The traditional arrangements were replaced with a formal 
statutory governance system during the early 1970s, However, the new system jarred with traditional practices and 
confusion between the two arrangements ensued. In addition to the changes in legal context, there were higher 
level dynamics as resource users began to enter from outside the area. In this context there was conflict between 
resource users. That conflict can be characterised as follows: 
•	 The	“outsiders”	appealed	to	the	new	national	polices,	and	their	rights	to	use	the	common	land	as	private	
land.
•	 The	“insiders”	who	relied	on	the	traditional	system	with	its	regulations	and	norms	for	dealing	with	the	natural	
resources, never accepted the new polices and consequently this undermined their control of natural 
resources in the new arrangement.
•	 Pastoralists	lost	access	to	migratory	routes	and	water	points	due	to	the	introduction	of	the	new	agricultural	
schemes.
•	 The	rich	farmers	of	the	mechanised	agricultural	schemes	used	armed	guards	to	protect	their	mechanised	
farms and keep the pastoralists and farmers away.
•	 Access	to	the	natural	resources	policies	and	legal	information	was	easier	for	the	outsiders	than	the	insiders.
The question of compensation has been raised by the indigenous actors. Are the negative impacts of environmental 
degradation and socioeconomic fragmentation more expensive than the benefits derived from launching and 
implementing the new policies? Are the local or national authorities responsible for paying such costs? In practice, 
the default position was local communities to shoulder the costs of the changes. These were some of the key 
dynamics in the unfolding conflict over resources in the Nuba Mountains. 
(Ahmed 2010).
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Experience of Environmental Governance 
Across the African Continent6
6.1  Environmental governance 
in context
A review of environmental governance (including 
its success or failure) across the Sahel has to be 
contextualised in terms of the wider governance 
framework and its evolution . While the concept 
of ‘good governance’ has underpinned the 
development agenda in Africa for at least 15 
years (as explained in Section 2), muted success 
in pursuing the goal of good governance has led 
to a recent questioning of the apparently universal 
notions behind the concept that may better reflect 
the history of the West than the history and current 
context of Africa (Booth, 2009) . This muted success 
has also fuelled calls for more locally-driven forms 
of governance, building on what exists, making 
use of indigenous institutional creativity, rooted in 
the socio-cultural context; Booth calls this ‘working 
with the grain’ (ibid) . This shifts the spotlight onto 
traditional and customary forms of governance, 
encourages decentralisation and greater attention 
paid to traditional leadership institutions which may 
be recognised through constitutional and legal 
frameworks . 
To some extent South Africa has followed this 
path; traditional governance was juxtaposed with 
that of the state ‘by ceding the administration of 
rural areas to traditional authorities through the 
control of land allocation’ (Economic Commission, 
2007: 19) . Interestingly, a recent survey across 19 
African countries found that the more people 
perceived state authority as legitimate, the more 
they showed support for traditional leaders; many 
interviewees did not consider formal/modern and 
traditional governance institutions to be entirely 
different and/or separate entities . This suggests 
that commitment to democracy and support for 
traditional leadership are not mutually exclusive, 
and that overall people want more, not less of their 
traditional leaders . The answers to the question “Do 
you think that the amount of influence traditional 
leaders have in governing your local community 
should increase, stay the same, or decrease?” are 
shown in Figure 3 . However, the author notes that 
the countries selected in this study represent the 
Figure 3.  Perceptions in 19 countries whether Traditional Leaders’ influence should increase or 
decrease. 
Source: Logan (2011)
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continent’s most open societies – those that have 
undergone some degree of political and eco-
nomic liberalisation in the last ten years – so may 
not be representative of the entire sub-Saharan 
region (Logan, 2011; IDEA, 2010) . 
The study found that the areas where traditional 
governance was perceived to be most relevant 
were in settling local disputes, allocation of land 
and in protection of rivers and forests . These results 
are shown in Figure 4 . Overall, Afrobarometer’s 
research concludes that there is an interest in 
increasing the role of traditional leadership in 
Africa . 
Despite this shift in thinking, however, the practice 
has still to catch up in terms of successfully 
integrating or juxtaposing traditional or customary 
governance with modern state governance . And 
as Booth has advised, this should be driven at the 
country level according to the local and national 
context . Busia (in IIAS and IDEA, 2009) has identified 
three ways in which customary governance is 
integrated into the formal state across the African 
continent:
1 . maintaining customary governance but as 
subordinate to the authority of the state which 
accepts or even creates parallel governance 
structures (for example in Zambia and Ghana);
2 . customary governance structures which 
effectively constitute a state in the form of 
a confederation, giving different groups the 
power to control and shape their governance 
structures and legislation;
3 . customary governance co-exists alongside the 
state, serving as a check on the non-customary 
state (for example in Botswana, Ghana and 
South Africa) . 
A number of authors (see Chopra and Hohe, 
2004, for example) warn against an uncritical 
acceptance of customary governance . Whether 
local structures are reinvented, integrated into 
formal governance structures, or simply reinforced, 
depends upon how they are functioning in terms of 
representation, egalitarianism and accountability 
to the community . Different analysts hold different 
views about whether we are currently witnessing a 
transitory process in which ultimately the modern 
state will prevail over traditional/ customary political 
structures, whether there can be a successful 
Figure 4.  Perceived distribution of responsibility for managing key public tasks in 19 countries “Who 
do you think actually has primary responsibility for managing each of the following tasks? Is it 
central government, local government, traditional leaders, or members of your community?”
Source: Logan (2011)
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A village land use map, as an outcome of 
participatory land use planning in Tanzania.
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cohabitation between modern and traditional 
structures, or whether local innovative responses 
to democratisation processes will introduce new 
innovative governance mechanisms (Logan, 2011) . 
6.2  Natural resource 
management, customary 
mechanisms and 
decentralisation in the 
Sahel
Customary mechanisms for managing natural 
resources have a long history in the Sahel . But 
there is also a widely shared experience of 
traditional institutions for resource management 
being “devalued and weakened by modern state 
policies that do not recognise them nor assign to 
them any meaningful role” (Borrini-Feyerabend, 
2007: 59), despite the recent rhetoric that appears 
to encourage the recognition of traditional institu-
tions . This is most extreme in the case of pastoralism 
where the customary NRM system fosters flexibility 
through informality, ad-hocness, un-boundness, 
impermanence and continuous socio-political 
negotiation – a system that is most likely to be at 
odds with the forces of economic modernisation 
and emergence of state power (ibid) .
Sudan illustrates this trend well . In the case of 
Darfur, customary mechanisms were embedded 
in the native administration .54 “For more than half 
a century [from the 1920s] the native administra-
tion provided a system of local governance 
that managed the use of natural resources and 
allowed various groups to live in relative peace and 
stability” (Abdul Jalil et al, 2007) . In many ways, this 
was a ‘shared management’ approach . However, 
as is now well-documented, the effectiveness 
of the native administration in Darfur has been 
eroded over time, for example through its abolition 
and then reinstatement during the 1970s, and 
especially through politicisation over a number of 
decades (ibid) . Morton (2011) provides a thorough 
analysis of the breakdown of what he calls ‘The 
Darfur Social Contract’ that was key to the native 
administration working effectively . This is widely 
associated with the deterioration of environmental 
governance at the local level .55 As Morton com-
ments: ”disputes over natural resources are nothing 
new . On the contrary, for Darfuris it is business as 
usual . The puzzle is to understand why that business 
has become so much more destructive . One 
reason is politics” (ibid: 4) .
Local agreements are often central to customary 
mechanisms for managing natural resources . 
Local agreements have been defined by Tall 
and Gueye (2004: 5) as ‘local arrangements 
formulated by communities to ensure better 
management of their natural resources’ . The same 
authors comment upon how the long tradition 
of shared management in the Sahel was upset 
by the droughts of the 1970s and by new forestry 
legislation which stifled initiatives for communal 
management . Conservation and reforestation 
became the focus rather than local participation . 
Local arrangements often arise when resources 
have been degraded and local communities 
want to address the situation . But in the words of 
Tache and Irwin (2003: 16): “resource degradation 
requires a socio-political solution rather than a 
technical fix” . Tall and Gueye see the emergence 
of local agreements for NRM as an innovative 
response to the breakdown of environmental 
governance in a number of countries:
The fact that the institutions which traditionally 
managed natural resources (customary chiefs, 
village headmen, land chiefs) have gradually 
been losing influence, together with the 
rigidity of modern regulatory systems, leaves 
a vacuum in which new local management 
mechanisms can emerge . (ibid: 7)
They see local agreements providing a methodo-
logical framework for managing natural resources, 
for example based on a participatory learning 
process agreed between parties with different 
interests, as a regulatory and institutional instru-
ment, and/ or as a tool for planning, managing 
and developing natural resources sustainably .
Many Sahelian countries have experimented 
with a more decentralised form of government 
in the last decade . In theory, this should mean 
the devolution of natural resource management: 
‘creating space to accommodate local interests 
and empowering local communities’ (Shackleton 
et al, 2002) . In practice, there is a sense that it has 
promised much, but so far delivered rather little, 
although there are valuable lessons to be learned .
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Controlled harvesting of trees, hay and other 
natural resources by the ‘Wend Panga’ Association 
in Boala, Burkina Faso.
A case study of decentralised natural resource 
management in the Inner Niger Delta of Mali 
illustrates some of the challenges well . This study 
shows the difficulty both of building a functional 
relationship between local government and 
customary systems, and of making legal pluralism 
work in such a way that statutory and customary law 
can co-exist (Cotula, n .d ., 2006a) . In this example, 
there is a mosaic of customary systems in place . 
Somehow they all need to be acknowledged, 
but this has not yet been achieved . For example, 
although the courts often try to apply customary 
laws to an institutionalised legal system, their 
limited understanding of customary laws and its 
context has led to problematic interpretations . The 
relationship between the traditional authority, the 
‘jowro’, and institutionalised authority through the 
commune is one of constant tension . The author 
calls for a more nuanced approach that can help 
promote dialogue between local government, the 
jowro, and other local actors . Above all, this case 
study highlights the importance of understanding 
power relations in processes of legal change, as 
this impacts on equity issues for local resource 
users, for example who are better able to bend 
the rules to their advantage? The author also chal-
lenges the perception of the relationship between 
customary and statutory law as a dichotomy 
between legality and legitimacy, formality and 
informality . In practice, the picture is much more 
complex and there are all sorts of combinations 
and hybrids between customary and statutory 
institutions .
Looking beyond the Sahel to Asia and Southern 
Africa, Shackleton et al (2002) conclude that 
the rhetoric and practice of devolution has 
diverged considerably, usually leaving the state in 
control of local NRM . Key features of the successful 
devolution of NRM are local people having strong 
alliances, being well-organised, and having 
knowledge of their rights and legislation governing 
NRM . One of the main reasons for the failure of 
devolution in achieving its goals is that the state 
and local people have different expectations of 
what devolution it supposed to achieve . Again, an 
analysis of power and governance is key, in relation 
to traditional leaders and to local government . 
For example, strong and legitimate traditional 
A community fishermen’s association manages this 
pond and the surrounding area in Yanfolila, Mali.
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leadership significantly helps to promote local 
people’s priorities, whereas weak and biased 
lineage leaders had lit tle support or role in 
community-based NRM .
A further complicating factor in many examples 
is that devolution of NRM is rarely complete, and 
the central authorities continue to drive the NRM 
agenda, or, as in the Mali case above, do not 
fully devolve power over state land and NRM more 
generally, especially forests, to the local authorities . 
This may be exacerbated by central and local 
government having different interests and priorities . 
This resonates with the situation in Sudan where 
there is often an ambiguous division of authority 
between federal and state level despite the 
decentralisation process (UNEP, 2011) .
Nori et al (2008) comment on how the benefits 
of decentralisation are yet to be experienced by 
pastoral communities ‘whose sense of disillusion-
ment and resentment towards state or religious 
institutions is an important element that should not 
go underestimated and that might help explain 
to an extent processes of political radicalisation 
in many pastoral regions’ (ibid:17) . This is further 
explored in Section 6 .3 below .
There have been numerous experiments across 
the Sahel to encourage and support shared 
management approaches . One such experiment 
was facilitated by SOS Sahel in the Borana lowlands 
in southern Ethiopia . One such experiment was 
facilitated by SOS Sahel in the Borana lowlands in 
southern Ethiopia where forests and pastoralism 
were in a familiar state of crisis to Sudan: under 
pressure from expanding agriculture, at high 
risk of inadequate rainfall and with degrading 
forests . Customary management systems had 
been undermined by policy, for example land 
tenure policy, which placed pastoral common 
lands under state ownership but failed to control 
either resource exploitation by urban users, timber 
extraction by merchants, or ranching . That failure 
indicates a misunderstanding on the part of 
policy makers, of the significance of mobility to 
pastoralist systems . As a consequence both the 
natural resources and the livelihoods associated 
with them, were in decline . 
The SOS Sahel project was an attempt to develop 
a new collaborative system of management, 
combining both customary (in this case the 
Gadaa – the traditional institution of the Borana 
Oromo that assumes ritual, political and religious 
responsibilities for an eight-year term of office) and 
modern institutions and actors (in this case the 
Peasant Association, the formal institution that is 
closest to the grassroots in Ethiopia’s decentralised 
system of governance) . Interestingly, the process 
Box 10. Action Research on the Shared Management of Common Property Resources – 
the process adopted by the Borana Collaborative Forest Management Project
The project identified three stages in developing collaborative forest management:
1) the investigation stage to understand forest use
2) the negotiation stage to produce forest management plans and shared management arrangements as a 
result of facilitated negotiation between different stakeholders
3) the implementation stage, of forest management agreements – learning by doing.
The first stage began with a stakeholder analysis, using participatory social mapping tools, the 3R’s matrix that 
captures stakeholders’ rights, responsibilities and revenue in relation to forest resources, and the mapping of 
relationships between primary and secondary stakeholders. This fed into a differentiation of stakeholders between 
direct and indirect users, and an analysis of stakeholders in terms of rights and interests. The results from this 
investigation stage fed into negotiation for a representative management structure, based on new relationships 
and partnerships according to mutual recognition of legitimate roles and defined responsibilities.
The key learning from this early stage of the project is that:
‘A multiple stakeholder resource project requires time for implementation if it is to produce enduring positive results. 
Working within short-term donor timeframes presents real risks, in that untimely withdrawal of support, or rushed 
processes, could cause serious problems in terms of the quality of new resource management systems being 
established’ (p45)
Source: Tache and Irwin, 2003
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has included ‘modernising’ customary institutions .56 
The aim has been negotiating a new common 
property management system in which both 
institutions are legitimate right-holders over the for-
est and co-manage it, with the traditional structure 
playing a lead role and the PA a supportive role . 
In this process the external development agency 
had a clear view of its role:
Decisions about change, and the shape of 
any new system, remain with the stakeholders 
involved . We, as development actors, are 
intending to facilitate a process of negotiation 
amongst stakeholders, if it is agreed that this 
is an appropriate way forward . (Tache and 
Irwin, 2003: 6)
Box 10 (on the previous page) sets out the process 
that underpinned this project .
The challenge with these local co-management 
projects is to ensure their sustainability after the 
external facilitation and support is withdrawn; and 
to ensure that the prevailing policy context will 
continue to support rather than undermine such 
initiatives .
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Environmental Governance and Pastoralism: 
defining and securing pastoralist rights  
in the Sahel
7
For decades the livelihood and NRM systems 
underpinning pastoralism have been poorly 
understood by governments and policy-makers 
around the world . This has resulted in the pro-
gressive marginalisation of pastoralist groups, 
politically, economically and socially, and a litany 
of failed development projects . A recent review of 
pastoralism and climate change captures this in 
the following statement:
Governments and other actors external 
to (the) pastoral system have persistently 
failed to understand the underlying rationale 
and dynamics of pastoralism . Colonial 
governments perceived pastoral lands to be 
unoccupied (having no owner) or underutilised 
and poorly managed thereby justified their 
appropriation by the State and classified as 
government or Crown property . This approach 
meant that grazing lands and migratory cor-
ridors could be alienated without consulting, 
or even informing, local communities . 
Garret Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ thesis 
in 1968 provided a convenient theoretical 
framework to justify existing perceptions of 
pastoralists as irrational land use managers 
by those external to the system (governments, 
academics, developers) . Although Hardin’s 
theory mislabelled pastoral resource tenure 
as open access and failed to recognise 
the critical role of customary institutions in 
regulating the management of common 
pool resources, it was extremely influential in 
A well-managed cattle migration in Darfur. 
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perpetuating negative myths of pastoralism 
being responsible for overstocking, desertifica-
tion and insecurity . (Nori et al, 2008: 10)
Swift (2003) sets out ten myths and misunderstand-
ings about pastoralism that have influenced and 
distorted policy decisions (see Box 11) . These 
perceptions are apparent in many countries 
in the Sahel and East Africa, including Sudan, 
and have resulted in inappropriate policies and 
‘development’ interventions such as ranching, and 
opening up dry season grazing through additional 
water points which upset the ecological balance 
and can result in over-grazing .57 The failure of 
these livestock policies discouraged donors from 
investing in livestock projects: ‘some now argue 
for a policy of benign neglect towards the dry 
areas on the grounds that little can be done 
there’ (Swift, 1991: 34) . Constant under-estimation 
of the contribution of pastoralism to the national 
economy (see Hesse and MacGregor, 2006, 
cited in section 3 .3 above) reinforces the rationale 
for a lack of support for this sector in favour of 
alternatives such as export-oriented commercial 
farming, for which it is easier to quantify the 
returns .
However, there has been growing evidence of the 
value of pastoralist production systems in dryland 
areas and of the role and significance of custom-
ary institutions in managing natural resources . For 
example, Swift (1991) made the case for basing 
modern natural resource policies on customary 
ways of doing things:
Provid(ing) the framework and incentives to 
enable such (customary) institutions to function 
more effectively and to evolve in desirable 
ways . This probably means providing statutory 
support and a contemporary legal framework 
to facilitate conflict resolution . In some cases it 
will be important to encourage a movement 
towards greater representivity’ (e .g . including 
women in decision-making) . (p . 37)
Box 11. Swift’s Ten Myths about Pastoralism
Myth 1: Nomadic pastoralism is an archaic form of production, whose time has passed
Nomadic pastoralism developed as a specialised form of production… to allow the productive use of extensive 
seasonal rangelands. Pastoralism is no more archaic than agriculture itself, and mobility was a feature from the 
beginning, allowing herders to use rich resources away from the early settlements.
Myth 2: Mobility is inherently backward, unnecessary, chaotic and disruptive
Pastoral mobility is a rational response to the scattered and uncertain distribution of natural resources. Most 
pastoral groups are found in environments with low and highly seasonal rainfall, where it is impossible to graze 
animals all year on the same pasture.
Myth 3: Most rangelands are degraded as a result of pastoral over-grazing
Grazing, like other uses, may cause a change in the plant species composition of rangelands, but if rangeland 
degradation is defined as a long-lasting or permanent reduction in livestock production, the evidence of widespread 
rangeland degradation under pastoral grazing is shaky…Grazing pressure is a less important determinant of species 
composition and biomass production than the amount of rain and available soil moisture.
Myth 4: Pastoralists do not take care of the land because of the ‘tragedy of the commons’
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ analysis rests on a misunderstanding. It supposes that all commons are open access, 
and that anyone can use them. In such circumstances competitive grazing leading to environmental damage could 
indeed occur. However, most collectively grazed pastures are not open access, but are or have traditionally been 
collectively managed by identified groups of users. In this case, it is entirely feasible for rights’ holders to agree to 
rules and enforce them.
Myth 5: Pastoralism has very low productivity. Sedentary cattle raising is more productive than mobile 
systems
Research shows that mobile pastoral systems have higher economic returns per hectare than ranching systems 
under similar conditions. 
Summarised extract from Swift, 2003
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He subsequently proposed three general principles 
to guide new forms of pastoral administration:
1 . flexibility and diversity in pastoral administra-
tion, that may combine customary kinship 
institutions, customary geographic rules and 
institutions (for example that regulate use of 
and access to land-based resources, formal 
institutions set up by government, and hybrid 
institutions that combine formal and customary 
elements);
2 . subsidiarity in pastoral administration so that 
administrative tasks are carried out as near to 
the levels of users of resources as is compatible 
with efficiency and accountability, and;
3 . reducing the transaction costs of administra-
tion, for example avoiding the unnecessary 
multiplication of administrative levels
(Swift. 1996)
A number of francophone Sahelian countries have 
been in the vanguard of changing their attitudes, 
and hence their policies, towards pastoralism in 
the last ten to fifteen years . Cotula et al (2005) 
cite pastoral legislation in a number of Sahelian 
countries as evidence of this shift . Often the 
legislation aims to reconcile different land uses, 
especially between pastoralism and agriculture, 
by allowing and regulating herd mobility . These 
changes in policy are explored by Touré (2005) . 
See Table 1 below . From the mid 1990s onwards 
there have been a number of initiatives across 
francophone Sahel aimed at helping pastoral 
communities assume greater responsibility for 
NRM, specifically securing their rights of access to 
natural resources, improving the management of 
pastoral lands and encouraging more integrated 
farming and livestock rearing . Interesting innova-
tions highlighted by Touré include:
•	 recognition of the economic importance of 
livestock rearing;
•	 reinstatement of pastoralism as a productive 
use of land;
•	 preservation of pastoral mobility;
•	 opportunities for herders to gain access to the 
strategic resources required to develop their 
activities;
•	 taking account of customary procedures in 
NRM;
•	 reinstating endogenous mechanisms for 
conflict arbitration and resolution .
But they also have their shortcomings, for example:
•	 transferring responsibilities for NRM to pastoral 
communities without giving them genuine 
decision-making powers;
•	 adopting a technocratic and interventionist 
approach that could, in the long run, reduce 
herders’ security of access to natural resources;
•	 pigeon-holing production activit ies and 
different types of natural resources due to a 
compartmentalised view of the development 
of rural production systems;
•	 a lack of support for the reforms from herders 
who may not be fully aware of the issues nor 
the reform process itself .
Hesse58 identifies three categories of limitations 
associated with these new pastoral laws:
1 . the failure of government to harmonise the pro-
visions within the pastoral laws with other laws, 
particularly laws relating to natural resources 
(water, forests, land) which deny or restrict 
pastoral access to or control over resources . This 
creates a policy/legislative confusion;
2 . inconsistencies, ambiguities and omissions 
within the pastoral laws which potentially 
open up ‘loop holes’ that might undermine 
pastoralism . For example, the Niger law fails to 
adequately define pastoral areas and where 
they are located and therefore where provisions 
for priority access apply;
3 . a lack of political will to implement the laws at 
national level, and even to an extent at local 
government level, particularly in more southerly 
agricultural areas .
Touré’s synthesis of the lessons of the Guinea experi-
ence, seem particularly relevant to Sudan – see 
Box 12 . Hesse and Thébaud (2006) conclude that 
there is a key lesson that can be drawn from many 
experiences in francophone Africa in which efforts 
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Table 1. A summary of recent pastoral legislation in francophone countries in the Sahel
Country Date and type of legislation Description
Niger 1993 – Code Rural Updated 
with sectoral legislation on 
pastoralism. The Ordonnance 
2010-029 relative au Pastoralisme 
has recently been passed
The Code Rural covered all productive activities in rural areas. Guarantees 
herders’ rights of access to natural resources and their priority rights in their 
home grazing territories.
The bill that has recently been passed legalises mobility, protects pastoral 
resources from alienation except in the public interest and only following 
compensation, recognises customary institutions and integrates decentralisation. 
It thus provides the legal framework to secure pastoralism.
Guinea 1995 – Code Pastoral and Code de 
l’élevage et des produits animaux
Sectoral legislation focused on pastoralism, to clarify herders’ rights of access to 
natural resources
Mauritania 2000 – Code Pastoral Sectoral legislation focused on pastoralism, defining the concepts and principles 
of sustainable management of pastoral lands, and rules to regulate pastoral 
activities. Also provides strong legal protection of mobility and pastoral resources.
Mali 2001 – Charte Pastoral Overarching legislation regulating the use of and access to pastoral resources. 
Establishes rights and responsibilities of pastoralists, legalises mobility, specifies 
institutions for its management in line with decentralisation, recognises and 
defines what constitutes ‘productive pastoral land use’ (mise en valeur).
Burkina Faso 2002 – framework law on 
pastoralism
Primary aim to establish the principles and modalities for sustainable, peaceful 
and integrated development of pastoral, agro-pastoral and sylvo-pastoral 
activities. Takes a static and technocratic approach based on creating pastoral 
reserves with the state regulating their use (eg fixing stocking rates). Seeks to 
settle and ring-fence pastoralists in home areas to control mobility.
Sources: Touré, 2005, and Hesse and Thébaud, 2006
Box 12. Pastoral Legislation in Guinea
The historical context in Guinea appears similar to Sudan. Land tenure legislation from the First Republic decreed 
that the state had eminent rights over land, and restricted individuals’ rights to land in which they had invested. A 
more liberal system was adopted with the inauguration of the Second Republic in 1984. However, one of the reasons 
for the Code Pastoral in 1995 was to resolve conflicts over the movement of livestock and to improve relations 
between farmers and herders, particularly in transhumant reception areas. Customary systems of negotiation had 
worked in the past, but came under pressure with the extension of farmland, declining pastoral practices and less 
stringent surveillance of livestock. Also decision-making has become more fragmented as traditional leadership is 
contested, for example by young men and women who feel that their interests are not being taken into account. 
Touré’s analysis is that the pastoral legislation was highly reactive in response to conflict, but that it throws up 
some valuable learning:
•	 stakeholders	must	fully	participate	in	the	formulation	of	legislation,	specifically	pastoralists	but,	in	the	case	
of Guinea, herders were poorly organised and the legislation was steered by public institutions instead. 
Particularly important for such specific legislation which has an impact at local level (compared with the 
formulation of framework law) there must be ‘grassroots appropriation’ of the legislation;
•	 information	on	legislation,	policies	and	programmes	must	be	accessible	to	herders,	but	this	has	not	been	the	
case in Guinea, even ten years after promulgation of the legislation;
•	 in	formulating	codes	and	laws,	attention	must	be	paid	to	how	they	will	be	implemented	to	ensure	that	the	
relevant institutions are viable and have sufficient authority to enforce their decisions, and there must be 
interaction with agencies exercising power at the local level, for example customary and local authorities. 
This did not happen in Guinea with the result that the vulnerable were further marginalised, and the better-
informed elites implemented the parts that serve their interests;
•	 it	is	important	to	recognise	the	diversity	of	modes	of	access	to	resources	(i.e.	it	is	not	just	transhumance)	in	
order ‘to permit the promotion of local agreements through the implementation of pastoral legislation’. 
Touré, 2005
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have been made to support pastoralism through 
legislation . That lesson is that it is very important 
that the pastoralists themselves develop leverage 
to improve the policy and legislation . In so doing 
they can ensure they are not further marginalised 
by critical flaws in the legislation .
Policies affecting pastoralism in East Africa 
have tended to be less progressive . Hesse and 
Macgregor (2006:8) quote a speech by the 
President of the United Republic of Tanzania in 
2005 to illustrate the prevailing view of pastoralism 
as backward and environmentally destructive, 
preventing the country from developing a modern 
livestock sector: ”We will take deliberate measures 
to improve the livestock sector . Our people must 
change from being nomadic cattle herders to 
being settled modern livestock keepers” . 
In this region too, however, there is evidence 
of change . In September 2009, the COMESA 
(Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa) Council of Ministers of Agriculture and 
Environment took a number of decisions related 
to livestock and pastoral development, including 
recognising the necessity of pastoral mobility as 
a strategy for production, trade and survival, and 
the importance of pastoralism to local, national 
and regional economies . More recently, in 2010 
the African Union adopted the first continent-wide 
policy framework for pastoralism that states that it: 
…aims to secure, protect and improve the lives, 
livelihoods and rights of African pastoralists . The 
policy framework is a platform for mobilising 
and coordinating political commitment to pas-
toral development in Africa, and emphasises 
the need to fully involve pastoralist women and 
men in the national and regional development 
processes from which they are supposed to 
benefit . The framework also emphasises the 
regional nature of many pastoralist ecosystems 
Camel migration in Darfur.
©
 N
om
ad
s 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t C
ou
nc
il
55Governance for Peace over Natural Resources
in Africa and therefore, the need to support 
and harmonise policies across the Regional 
Economic Communities and Member States .
(African Union, 2010: i) .
In Kenya, a draft policy paper for the develop-
ment of Northern Kenya and other arid lands 
in the country sets out to protect and promote 
pastoralist mobility and to support the customary 
institutions which underpin pastoralism . Specifically, 
it proposes that:
The Government will:
•	 Recognise, through legislation, pastoralism 
as a legitimate form of productive land use 
and development on the same basis as 
farming, and incorporate the value of dryland 
goods and services within national economic 
planning .
•	 Ensure that decentralised structures accom-
modate mobility and resource-sharing across 
administrative boundaries and draw on the 
knowledge and experience of customary 
institutions . (Office of the Prime Minister, 2010: 
29) 
There is a growing body of literature that makes 
the case that pastoralism may actually be 
one of the livelihoods best suited to increasing 
climatic variability, which is widely expected to 
be one of the features of climate change in 
arid and semi-arid lands .59 Based on research 
amongst the Wodaabe in Niger – among other 
sources – Kratli and Schareika (2010: 615) go 
further in demonstrating how ”dryland pastoralism 
as an agricultural production system … exploits 
asymmetric distribution rather than stability and 
uniformity in the environment” . This is summed up 
by Nori et al (2008:16) who state that ”pastoralism 
is a livelihood system highly adapted to cope 
with environments characterised by ecological 
scarcity and climatic unpredictability”, but its 
success depends upon access to different eco-
zones at different times, and it is this access that 
could be compromised by inappropriate policy 
that hampers their mobility . They also make the 
case that pastoralists may be “one of the best 
detectors of environmental change” because 
of their profound knowledge and experience of 
complex ecosystem dynamics (ibid: 5) . However, 
pastoralism is under considerable pressure across 
the Sahel (and elsewhere in the world) from:
1 . population growth, as the technical possibilities 
of increasing rangeland productivity sustainably 
are limited;
2 . economic differentiation which is affecting 
the way that livestock are reared, and driving 
a trend towards the enclosure of water points 
and pastures for private use . (According to 
some estimates absentee livestock owners own 
around 50% of the Sahelian livestock herd, as 
quoted in Nori et al);
3 . changing gender and generational relation-
ships within pastoral societies, most evident as 
young men challenge traditional leadership 
structures and engage in armed commercial 
raiding, banditry, and enrolment in insurgent 
movements;
4 . the weakening of customary institutions and 
poor governance which undermines systems 
for managing competing access to resources .
(ibid) .
Despite this, there is a new-found optimism 
about the future of pastoralism, summarised 
by Swift (2003): ”A more realistic vision of future 
pastoralism envisages a flourishing economy, with 
well-educated and successful pastoral producers, 
no longer marginalised from mainstream society” . 
This is predicated on rethinking a number of 
policies, for example:
1 . the basic structure of the pastoral economy 
must recognise how the main production inputs 
are provided through non-market mechanisms 
(in contrast to a ranching model), for example 
land is accessed communally through lineage 
and other social relationships, and livestock are 
mainly acquired through social mechanisms, 
especially family inheritance;
2 . policies to manage dry lands sustainably: land 
use policies that halt encroachment by farmers 
and nature conservationists onto pastoral land 
must be promoted, except where multiple uses, 
of benefit to all, can be negotiated; there must 
be greater capital investment in rangeland 
e .g . providing water or rehabilitating degraded 
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agricultural land; positive examples of pastoral-
ist associations managing pastures and water 
(usually based on customary systems) should 
be built upon and given formal backing by 
government;60 
3 . clarifying and strengthening pastoral tenure 
systems, for example corporate tenure for 
pasture and high capacity water points 
whereby ‘well-defined, usually kin-based 
associations of herders, who negotiate among 
themselves stocking rates, rules, responsibilities 
and management objectives . The state can 
retain overall ownership of such resources, while 
granting long (50 year) renewable leases to 
pastoralist groups under well-defined conditions 
about the quality of use, and providing an 
accepted legal framework to settle disputes 
which cannot be resolved by the herders 
themselves’ (ibid: 10) .61
To support this vision, a mixed approach to govern-
ance is required:
Varying with local circumstances, of formal 
and informal institutions and rules, and this mix 
should move towards greater involvement and 
responsibility for strengthened informal institu-
tions . The role of formal government should be 
to provide a framework within which customary 
local institutions and rules regulate everyday 
economic and political affairs . (Swift, 2003: 14)
For example, formal government could provide 
the legal framework for natural resource tenure, 
and for a devolved pastoral administration . It could 
mediate conflict as an arbiter of last resort, and be 
a guarantor of minimum democratic processes in 
local administration, recognising that customary 
institutions can be hierarchical and undemocratic 
(ibid) .
The voice of indigenous people, includ-
ing pastoralists, is also being promoted in 
international environmental programmes such 
as the UN REDD+ Programme (United Nations 
Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
in Developing Countries) . The REDD+ process 
places emphasis on wide consultations with 
indigenous populations and resource users, which 
may support sustainable co-management of 
resources in such instances . In addition, the REDD+ 
process requires social and environmental impact 
assessments, which include the recognition of the 
customary land rights of indigenous populations, 
and which consider local best practices for NRM 
(UN REDD, 2009) .
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Conclusions  
and Recommendations8
A woman moves with her belongings on a cattle migration in Darfur.
As this review demonstrates, the thinking and 
practice behind approaches to sustainable 
and equitable environmental governance have 
evolved over time . The African continent, and 
especially the Sahel, is a source of rich experience 
and reflection of what has worked in different 
contexts and why . There is a correspondingly rich 
literature to draw upon that documents failure as 
well as success and offers valuable learning from 
the analysis of both .
This experience is of immediate relevance to 
rural Sudan in the search for approaches to 
NRM that move beyond competition between 
livelihood groups that can quickly become 
violent in a context of conflict, to approaches 
that promote the concept of interdepend-
ence and co-management . At the heart of 
co-management is power-sharing, based on 
negotiated, joint decision-making mechanisms 
that involve all relevant actors, recognising their 
diversity and building upon their complementarity . 
Rather than a fixed set of rules, the concept of 
co-management is of a dynamic process of 
partnership . It is underpinned by some of the basic 
principles of good governance, including equity 
and participation .
The principles and basic premise of co-man-
agement can be introduced into the thinking 
and dialogue about NRM in Sudan, exploring 
what this might mean in practice and identifying 
examples of where this already exists, is effective, 
and can be built upon . Similarly, the participatory 
management of ecosystems as a whole, rather 
than considering particular demands for natural 
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resources in isolation, needs to be integrated with 
emerging recovery and development initiatives .
Experiences of co-management of natural 
resources that have worked, usually at the local 
level based upon local agreements, have usefully 
been documented . As in the case of the Borana in 
southern Ethiopia, some of these processes have 
been facilitated by external actors, for example 
INGOs . Where customary approaches to NRM 
have been at their most effective, these are often 
examples of co-management, and this includes 
co-management of common property resources . 
One of the challenges for customary approaches, 
however, is how they evolve alongside processes 
of modernisation, the assertion of formal state 
structures and the increasing commercialisation 
of agriculture and livestock production . Sudan’s 
experience of the declining effectiveness of Native 
Administration in sustainable and equitable NRM 
illustrates these challenges well . How to combine 
customary and statutory regimes is a dominant 
theme in much of the literature on environmental 
governance at the national and local levels (and 
indeed in the wider literature on governance in 
Africa) . What clearly emerges is that there is no 
blueprint or road map, and that the distinction 
between customary and statutory, informal and 
formal systems is rarely as stark and clear-cut in 
practice as it may appear in theory . For decades, 
government policy in many African countries has 
favoured the wholesale replacement of customary 
systems, particularly around land tenure, with 
formal and modern systems . However, this is now 
giving way to a growing awareness that land 
policies and laws that build on local practice 
are likely to be the most effective . International 
environmental governance supports this: REDD+ 
for example emphasises the inclusion of the 
indigenous voice .62 The challenge is finding a way 
of integrating customary and statutory systems . 
This can be a messy and complex process, but 
it must be contextually specific, building on local 
practice, and based upon a profound knowledge 
of local dynamics, especially power dynamics, of 
Brickmaking has boomed during the conflict in Darfur as a result of the inflated housing market related to the 
international humanitarian and peace-keeping presence. The industry has provided an important source of 
income for displaced communities but has come with a considerable environmental impact.
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customary processes . There are positive examples 
to learn from, for example, on land tenure . Kenya’s 
new Land Policy of 2007 recognises and protects 
customary rights to land, formally recognising 
community land for the first time, and is based 
on a hierarchy of institutions from community to 
national level . But support to, or integration of 
customary institutions and mechanisms must 
not be uncritical, nor should it mean enshrining 
inequitable or gender-blind customary systems in 
statutory law . Formal and statutory mechanisms 
may need to play a key role in protecting the 
rights of the marginalised and in ensuring the 
representation of all .
Experience from elsewhere and the discussion 
of international principles around environmental 
governance both point to the importance of the 
role of women . This is reinforced by the key tenets of 
co-management – the inclusion and representa-
tion of users of resources in decision-making . 
The significance of women as resource users, in 
the home and in pursuing livelihood strategies 
reconfirms the importance of their inclusion in 
resource management . Similarly the role of youth 
and other marginalised groups are important: 
youth are particularly significant given the process 
of demographic change in Sudan and the ‘youth 
bulge’ . Here, again, environmental governance 
needs to evolve in response to a changing context 
and to do so peacefully and inclusively in order 
to mitigate tensions that emerge from antiquated 
systems that no longer meet current demands nor 
the needs of all local stakeholders .
As regards entry points for work in this area, 
numerous opportunities are available in a dynamic 
context63 such as Sudan . Policy work is likely to be 
more effective if linked with implementation – the 
practical activity draws together stakeholders 
and grounds the process of policy-making in the 
realities at local level . Practical programming can 
implement models that may subsequently be 
developed into policy and institutional capacity . 
A well-managed agricultural shelter belt in Northern State. In order to reduce desertification, 20% of 
agricultural land should be planted with forestry. In practice this figure is rarely achieved.
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Study tours have proven effective in Darfur in 
building a shared vision for new forms of govern-
ance – UNEP found experience of the shift to 
more equitable and participatory water resource 
management in South Africa resonated well with 
Darfuri water sector colleagues . 
There has been a general trend across much of 
the African continent, including Sudan, towards 
decentralisation of power and of natural resource 
management . This can contribute to promoting 
local, contextually-specific approaches to 
environmental governance . Where this has failed, 
however, has often been due to there being only 
partial devolution of authority to the local level, 
resulting in the state and local people having differ-
ent expectations of what devolution it is supposed 
to achieve . Key features of successful devolution 
of NRM include local people having strong shared 
objectives and being well-organised, and having 
a good comprehension of the relevant legislation . 
Efforts across the Sahel to recognise the rights of 
pastoralists and the common property regimes on 
which they usually depend is a particularly rich vein 
of experience to draw upon that illustrates much 
of the above . Analysis of these efforts emphasise 
the critical importance of involving the key 
stakeholders in the process of review and reform 
if new legislation and structures are to work, and 
the importance of transferring decision-making 
powers as well as responsibility for NRM . Political 
will to follow through and implement new pastoral 
laws is critical .
A breakdown in environmental governance (often 
customary forms of governance) in relation to land 
tenure and land rights has been, and continues 
to be, at the heart of most of Africa’s conflicts, at 
least since the 1990s, and Darfur is no exception . In 
these conditions legal pluralism may be at its most 
dynamic as informal legal fields proliferate . At best, 
this may provide welcome room for manoeuvre 
and negotiation thus reducing the likelihood 
of violence in a peace process . At worst, legal 
pluralism may undermine any peace agreement 
and may facilitate land-grabbing . Which scenario 
prevails will depend upon the local context . Few 
peace processes across Africa, however, have 
successfully addressed land grievances and have 
thus stored up problems for the post-conflict phase . 
Nevertheless, there is now valuable experience 
and learning to be drawn upon for dealing with 
land tenure in the peace process . Ensuring that 
land and environmental governance issues are 
placed high on the peacemaking agenda and 
given emphasis in the follow up and implementa-
tion is essential .
Recommendations
Based on this review of environmental governance 
it is recommended that:
1 .  Processes of consultation for institutional 
and constitutional reform should be sup-
ported with exposure to developments in 
environmental governance from across 
Africa. Awareness of principles and concepts, 
successes and failures in environmental 
governance would enhance dialogue over the 
links between environment, livelihoods, conflict 
mitigation and governance . These links are 
important in discussions about managing natural 
resources between different communities and 
therefore in consultations about constitutional 
arrangements . This is particularly relevant to the 
Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation 
and to the ongoing consultations over the new 
constitution in Sudan . 
2 .  The concepts of equitable participatory 
environmental governance should inform 
peace processes in Sudan. Negotiators 
should be informed of viable models for, and 
experience of, peaceful co-management of 
resources so that institutions and protocols man-
dated in peace agreements can draw upon 
these . Promoting awareness of these concepts 
and experiences will support the development 
of equitable environmental governance in 
areas emerging from conflict in which control of 
natural resources has had a role . This would be 
relevant to the border areas of Sudan and South 
Sudan; to peace processes that may emerge 
in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states; and 
to the implementation of the Doha Document 
for Peace in Darfur.
3 .  The ideas from across Africa reviewed in this 
report should be made available to inform 
reform and development of environmental 
policy and institutions in Sudan. Support 
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should be given to capacity building for 
line ministries with a coordinated approach 
at both State and Federal level . Such support 
should include technical exchanges with other 
countries and joint reviews of best practice . 
In particular, the Darfur Regional Authority 
should be supported in its efforts to formulate 
policies and build institutions that mitigate 
conflict over natural resources .
4 .  Support should be given to projects that 
pilot and demonstrate innovation and best 
practice on environmental governance – 
inclusive processes such as Community Based 
Natural Resource Management, integrated 
wadi catchment management (and IWRM 
in general) and community forestry . Where 
environmental projects (such as tree planting) 
are implemented in order to promote peace, 
then equitable environmental governance at 
local and regional levels must be emphasised 
within these projects . For example, tree planting 
alone does not promote peace, but resolving 
issues of land tenure for contested forestry, 
establishing participatory forest committees 
and supporting revenue sharing from forest 
livelihoods contribute to peace, and tree 
planting would be an appropriate component 
of such projects . Similarly, water projects need 
an emphasis on participatory decision-making, 
equitable water sharing, cost recovery and 
maintenance, in addition to the provision of 
pumps and hafirs .
5 .  Social and environmental impact assess-
ments of development projects, agricultural 
projects and concessions, mining and 
peacekeeping operations should include 
a sound understanding of the governance 
context in which they operate. Where there is 
a dynamic process in governance or a context 
of legal pluralism (both of which are common 
in Sudan) then these assessments should 
identify how the interventions would influence 
this process . The scope of such assessments 
would include impacts through land use, 
procurement, and empowerment of stakehold-
ers identified as interlocutors and consultees . 
The intervention may impact the ongoing 
interaction of formal government, traditional 
leadership, civil society and community rep-
resentatives – this impact should be identified 
and the potential consequences analysed . For 
example, if hafirs are built through humanitarian 
aid, then the work should be undertaken in 
collaboration with both formal government 
bodies such as the state water corporation and 
with local community or traditional leadership 
to ensure consultation around community 
access and to clarify responsibilities for man-
agement and maintenance of the hafir . Project 
procedures should support best practice in 
the collaboration between communities and 
government in management of projects and 
their results, drawing on the principles of co- 
management .
6 .  The principles and practices identified in 
this report should be developed further 
in the context of thematic areas within 
environmental governance – to draw out 
the implications, for example, for water 
resource management, forestry, agriculture, 
livestock production and mining . Important 
emerging initiatives on this include Integrated 
Water Resource Management, National 
Adaptation Plan – (NAP and NAPA), REDD Plus, 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management, and 
work on pastoralist livelihoods . In addition to the 
issues addressed in this report, further attention 
is needed on ecosystems management and 
the green economy . 
7 .  Best practice and experience of par-
ticipatory policy-making on environmental 
governance should inform cross cutting 
issues in strategic plans. These would 
include capacity building, conflict sensitive 
approaches and the environment . In the UN 
context these have all been highlighted as 
cross cutting in the 2013-16 Sudan UNDAF .64 
Other processes would include government 
strategic planning, the Humanitarian Work Plan 
and UNAMID/UNCT joint planning mechanisms . 
These features should be emphasized in the 
follow up to the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission 
and the implementation of the Strategy for 
Recovery in Darfur .
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Glossary
Co-management  
of natural resources
A process of collective understanding and action by which human 
communities and other social actors manage natural resources 
and ecosystems together, drawing from everyone’s unique 
strengths, vantage points and capacities (Borrini-Feyerabend et al, 
2007: xxx)
Environmental governance The norms, rules and institutions that regulate the actions and 
interactions of government, civil society and the private sector in 
relation to the environment
Gender equitable  
land tenure
Equitability (fairness) between women and men in matters of land 
tenure governance… through both formal institutions and informal 
arrangements for land administration and management  
(Daley and Mi-young Park, 2011: 2)
Hafir A small reservoir
Khorr A small wadi
Land tenure The relationship, whether defined legally or customarily, among 
people with respect to land (FAO, 2007: 3)
Land administration The way in which the rules of land tenure are applied and made 
operational . It includes land registration, land use planning, land 
consolidation, land management and property taxation  
(FAO, 2007: 3)
Legal Pluralism Refers to separate social fields of ‘legality’ overlapping and 
interacting, often a mixture of customary, statutory and hybrid
Subsidiarity The delegation of authority to the most appropriate level of 
governance (often interpreted and advocated as the delegation 
of authority to lower levels of governance)
Wadi An ephemeral river
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Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
Annex 1
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Having met at Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992,
Reaffirming the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at 
Stockholm on 16 June 1972, a/ and seeking to build upon it,
With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels 
of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people,
Working towards international agreements which respect the interests of all and protect the integrity of 
the global environmental and developmental system,
Recognizing the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth, our home,
Proclaims that:
Principle 1
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development . They are entitled to a healthy 
and productive life in harmony with nature .
Principle 2
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction .
Principle 3
The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental 
needs of present and future generations .
Principle 4
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part 
of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it .
Principle 5
All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and 
better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world .
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Principle 6
The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most 
environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority . International actions in the field of environment 
and development should also address the interests and needs of all countries .
Principle 7
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem . In view of the different contributions to global environmental degrada-
tion, States have common but differentiated responsibilities . The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures 
their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command .
Principle 8
To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce and 
eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic 
policies .
Principle 9
States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable development by 
improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and 
by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and 
innovative technologies .
Principle 10
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant 
level . At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the 
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities 
in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes . States shall facilitate 
and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available . Effective 
access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided .
Principle 11
States shall enact effective environmental legislation . Environmental standards, management objectives 
and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply . Standards 
applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other 
countries, in particular developing countries .
Principle 12
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would 
lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems 
of environmental degradation . Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade . Unilateral 
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actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be 
avoided . Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, 
as far as possible, be based on an international consensus .
Principle 13
States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other 
environmental damage . States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to 
develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental 
damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction .
Principle 14
States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the relocation and transfer to other States of 
any activities and substances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to be harmful 
to human health .
Principle 15
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities . Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation .
Principle 16
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use 
of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear 
the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment .
Principle 17
Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities 
that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of 
a competent national authority .
Principle 18
States shall immediately notify other States of any natural disasters or other emergencies that are likely to 
produce sudden harmful effects on the environment of those States . Every effort shall be made by the 
international community to help States so afflicted .
Principle 19
States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected States 
on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult 
with those States at an early stage and in good faith .
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Principle 20
Women have a vital role in environmental management and development . Their full participation is 
therefore essential to achieve sustainable development .
Principle 21
The creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should be mobilized to forge a global 
partnership in order to achieve sustainable development and ensure a better future for all .
Principle 22
Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a vital role in environmental 
management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices . States should 
recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in 
the achievement of sustainable development .
Principle 23
The environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation shall 
be protected .
Principle 24
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development . States shall therefore respect international 
law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further 
development, as necessary .
Principle 25
Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible .
Principle 26
States shall resolve all their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations .
Principle 27
States and people shall cooperate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership in the fulfilment of the 
principles embodied in this Declaration and in the further development of international law in the field 
of sustainable development .
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Darfur Climate Change Vision Document
Annex 2
Vision Document 
Preamble 
The Darfur region faces acute vulnerability to the impact of climate change . The impact includes 
increasing climatic variability particularly increasing frequency of drought . In North Darfur this is already 
evident with 16 of the driest 20 years on record having taken place since 1972 . The significance of this 
is that it translates into increasing vulnerability for the people in Darfur in the form of failed harvests and 
challenges for pastoralism . 
Climate change has to be seen in the context of other processes of change . In addition to climate change 
these processes include, for example: population growth; migration; rapid urbanisation; environmental 
degradation; restricted access to natural resources, technological and economic changes; and the 
impacts of conflict . 
Consequently adaptation and recovery programmes need to address these issues holistically . Examples 
would include: 
•	 Integrating support to both urban and rural livelihoods programming into a forestry progamme (eg 
processing fruits in towns for export) .
•	 The National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) project for South Darfur plans for water harvesting, crop 
production, range management, animal production, forestry and horticulture . 
•	 Integrated approaches such as addressing water and forestry together with catchment management 
programmes . 
Increasing climate variability puts an emphasis on the need for drought cycle management which 
includes programmes such as fodder supply, destocking and restocking and water resource manage-
ment . Mitigating the impacts of the conflict includes reversing the adoption of “maladaptive” livelihood 
coping strategies . Maladaptive strategies are livelihood activities that are unsustainable or have negative 
impacts on others . 
Adaptation to climate change and concurrent processes of change and longer term recovery requires 
evidence-based policy and programmes built on applied research and best practice . The work will 
require an emphasis on building capacity of line ministries, civil society and communities and supporting 
the process of collaboration between customary and statutory governance . The current insecurity in the 
Darfur region was an issue that pervaded all the group discussions during the retreat and needs to be 
considered in the development of implementable plans for programmes in Darfur .
Vision 
Work done by six thematic groups contributes towards a future vision for Darfur, beyond short term 
humanitarian action, that is based upon: 
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•	 A more urbanised settlement pattern, based on sound structural plans and, therefore, urban economy . 
•	 The combination of a rural economy based on higher value livestock, forestry and agricultural products 
(cash crops) and an urban economy that is based on the processing of those products . Research to 
underpin the development of appropriate economic planning . 
•	 Pastoralists shifting to more economic production systems of livestock based on a number of livestock 
production models (transhumance, ranches, zero grazing) . Services being adapted to serve those 
engaged in the different production models . If essential services are provided to transhumant pastoral-
ists, many will eventually choose to settle, and pastoralist systems will become more sustainable and 
economically productive .
•	 IWRM, including catchment management and urban pollution control for effective, sustainable and 
inclusive management of water . 
•	 Achieving sustainable forestry resources, through reforestation, afforestation and conservation . 
•	 Agricultural innovation building on what local communities are already doing successfully . 
•	 Promotion of alternative energy and construction methods . 
•	 Community-based approaches that make increased use of local institutions such as Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) and service delivery sub-committees 
•	 Underpinning all of the above by aligning and ensuring complementarily between federal state and 
customary laws, especially relating to land tenure . 
•	 Capacity-building of formal and informal institutions . 
Priorities Identified 
Trade and the economy 
•	 Planning for the transition from Darfur’s somewhat artificial emergency economy to a future more 
sustainable economy . 
•	 Improved infrastructure eg transport and communications, energy and water infrastructure . 
•	 Increased provision of banking facilities and micro-credit . 
Pastoralist livelihoods 
•	 Recognition of the importance and needs of livestock mobility to the future of pastoralist livelihoods . 
•	 Education for pastoralists including skills based training and adult literacy targeting youth and women . 
•	 Pasture rehabilitation . 
•	 Research on new patterns of animal disease (related to climate change) . 
•	 Developing a model for pastoralism, learning from experiences inside and outside Darfur . 
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•	 Awareness-raising among pastoralists on climate change adaptation and improvement of quality of 
livestock production . 
Forestry 
•	 Projects that promote participatory reforestation and afforestation . 
•	 Capacity-building of formal and informal institutions, ranging from local communities to the FNC, 
raising awareness of, and providing training in nursery techniques and tree planting . 
Agricultural innovation 
•	 Agro-forestry, including integrating fruit trees, fodder trees and the planting of shelter belts into the 
agricultural system . 
•	 Managing scarce water resources between livestock and agricultural production . 
•	 Technology that promotes sustainable agriculture eg soil conservation . 
•	 Promotion of crop and herd diversification . 
Energy and construction 
•	 The development of policies, legislation, standards and guidelines on construction and energy . 
•	 The immediate adoption of alternative building technologies by government, UN and INGOs for all 
new buildings . 
•	 Government, UN and INGOs developing appropriate alternative energy sources . 
Water resource management 
•	 Capacity building for government and civil society for water user and water management forums . 
•	 Multi-purpose water harvesting projects with community management . 
•	 Integrating water management, forestry, agriculture and livelihoods projects as first step towards 
catchment management . 
•	 Capacity building programme for maintenance of surface water e .g . hafirs and dams . 
Note on process 
The retreat was held on 23-24 March 2010 at Crimson Lights restaurant in El Fasher, North Darfur . The retreat 
was hosted by the office of the Deputy Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator of the UN for Sudan (Darfur) 
in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment and Physical Development represented by the Higher 
Council for Environment and Natural Resources . The stated objectives of the workshop were: 
•	 To consult with practitioners and decision makers and draw on action research; lessons learned; policy 
and practice in order to develop a vision for adaptation to climate change in Darfur . 
•	 To facilitate collaboration among stakeholders to work towards the development of a recovery strategy 
for Darfur . 
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In this document the preamble provides a summary of technical presentations made by the Higher 
Council for Environment and Natural Resources (www .hcenr .org); the Agricultural Research Station, Nyala; 
UNEP (http://postconflict .unep .ch/publications .php?prog=sudan) and Tufts University, Feinstein International 
Centre (http://go .tufts .edu/FIC-Darfur) . 
The vision and priority action points were identified with the following process . After the technical presenta-
tions, thematic groups were established that discussed the following five questions relating to adaptations 
in Darfur: (1) What are the short-term adaptations taking place? (2) What is driving these adaptations? (3) 
Which of these are ‘maladaptations’? (4) What are the implications of the above for sustainable livelihoods 
in Darfur in the longer term? (5) What are the priorities for action? 
The outputs of these groups were reviewed and commented on in plenary with a “gallery walk” by all 
groups to review the flipcharts produced by each group . From the annotated records of the thematic 
groups a draft vision statement and priority action list was written by a technical secretariat (UNEP and 
Tufts), which was reviewed and revised by the thematic working groups . The output of this process forms 
this document . (Initially a water resources group was not included, but the meeting requested a group 
which was formed during the gallery walk and moved straight to preparing the vision and priorities 
sections .) Detailed records of the discussion and more details of the conference are available at http://
climatechange .sudanct .net
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A Review of Peace Agreements in Africa and How Land Issues 
were Addressed
Annex 3
Angola 
Lusaka Protocol (2004)
www .c-r .org/our-work/accord/angola/lusaka-protocol .php#6
Extent to which land/resources were an issue
Land was a serious issue during the conflict . Its distribution and ownership, along with the income generated 
from it, was the cause of significant inequalities among the Angolan population . 
While not necessarily a cause of the conflict, access to resources played an important role in fuelling it . 
The UNITA rebels controlled much of the country’s diamond fields while the country’s oil wealth was a big 
incentive for power . UNITA’s success in mining diamonds and selling them abroad at an inflated price 
allowed the war to continue even as their domestic support deteriorated . The UN estimates that UNITA 
made at least $3 .72 billion from diamond sales .
How was that issue dealt with?
The Lusaka Protocol was a comprehensive peace agreement signed by the government of Angola 
and the UNITA rebel movement . The principal parts of the agreement concerned demobilisation of the 
UNITA rebels and developing ‘national reconciliation’, which included a power-sharing deal between the 
government and the rebels, giving UNITA members key posts in the government . 
The land / resources issue was not addressed in the peace agreement beyond the provision of housing 
for key UNITA members serving in government . The proposed demobilisation of UNITA would indirectly, 
of course, bring diamond fields back under government control . Fundamentally the peace agreement 
focussed on the allocation of state power . However, this agreement did not hold and the war continued until 
2002 when the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi was killed and the rebel organisation was defeated militarily .
With no provisions to address land rights in the peace process, the structural problem remained whereby 
land ownership was concentrated in the hands of the political elite, members of the armed forces and 
businessmen, at the expense of the rest of the population . It was not until the end of the war in 2002 
that the land issue came to the fore through the drafting of a new Land Bill . This brought the land issue 
to the centre of national debate and brought greater clarity on a variety of issues including the right of 
communities to titles granting them ownership rights and the right of communities to recover land taken 
unlawfully from them during the colonial period .
Sources:
http://www .c-r .org/our-work/accord/angola/land-peacebuilding .php
http://www .c-r .org/our-work/accord/angola/lusaka-key-points .php
http://www .c-r .org/resources/policy-briefings/angola-policy-briefing .php
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Mozambique
General Peace Agreement (1992)
http://www .c-r .org/our-work/accord/mozambique/rome-process .php
Extent to which land/resources were an issue
The war in Mozambique was principally a struggle for power between the Marxist-oriented FRELMO govern-
ment and an anti-Communist resistance group RENAMO . Both sides received significant international 
support with the Soviet Union backing FRELIMO and Rhodesia and then South Africa backing RENAMO . 
Control of land and resources was not a key dynamic in the conflict, but land was nonetheless a significant 
issue . For the Marxist FRELIMO party, nationalizing ownership of land and centralizing control over land 
and its resources was a critical component in the drive to construct socialism throughout the country . 
While the state assumed ownership over land, smallholder families and communities retained their use 
rights to the land they occupied under customary tenure .
How was that issue dealt with?
The General Peace Agreement was signed between President Chissano of Mozambique and the president 
of RENAMO Afonso Dhlakama in Rome . It combined four previous protocols signed by the government 
and RENAMO to finalise the peace process . A ceasefire came into place after its ratification, followed 
by the phased cessation of hostilities and integration of the combatants into a new army of 30,000 . The 
remaining combatants were disarmed and demobilised under UN supervision . This was followed by the 
transformation of RENAMO into a political party and the holding of free multiparty elections one year 
later, which took place successfully . 
The issue of land was not directly addressed in the peace agreement but became an issue of controversy 
in the immediate post-war period . Government agencies began haphazardly distributing land rights to 
new and returning private, national and foreign enterprises as well as to government officials through the 
privatisation of the vast state farm sector, reactivation of former colonial titles, and granting of concessions . 
It is estimated that by May 1994, 40 million hectares of land, more than half of Mozambique’s total area, 
had been granted in concessions or ‘sold’ to commercial enterprises . This practice helped to create the 
emergence of a new category of post-war displaced families . 
Despite numerous land-related problems reported in the daily press and by rural Mozambicans, private 
investors, NGOs and other civil organisations operating in rural areas, the government remained largely silent 
on the issue of land tenure reform . A 1993 joint government-UN report on the transition from emergency 
assistance to reconstruction did not even mention land issues . Two years after the war there was still no 
government mechanism to monitor land concessions or occupation and not department or agency 
within government that could monitor grants and determine community land rights . 
A 1994 article on the issue of post-war land reform stated that there was:
“an urgent need for comprehensive discussion on land policy reform, natural resource management, 
and decentralised access to and control over resources . This discussion must address fundamental 
questions, including what types of land rights will exist, or more specifically what types of property rights 
will be permitted; who will have the power to distribute land rights; and how and by whom land disputes 
will be settled .”
(G . Myers, ‘Competitive Rights, Competitive Claims: Land Access in Post-war Mozambique’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol . 20, Number 4, (1994), p . 605 )
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Once multi-party elections were completed in 1994, the government was able to make more progress 
on the issue of land reform . Over a period of four years, three key pieces of legislation were developed 
and approved: the Land Law, the Land Regulations and the Technical Annex . This legislation was the 
product of collaboration between government, civil society and the NGO community (including religious 
organisations) . The result was a set of solid instruments for legitimate policy implementation that has been 
praised by international organisations such as the FAO . 
Source: www .fao .org/docrep/003/x8050t/x8050t04 .htm
Sierra Leone 
Lomé Peace Agreement (1999)
http://www .sierra-leone .org/lomeaccord .html
Extent to which land/resources were an issue
The role of resources in conflict in Sierra Leone was important but not in what might be seen as the 
traditional sense . There was undoubtedly a sense among the youth who largely made up the rebel RUF 
movement, that neither they nor the people at large saw much benefit from the country’s rich diamond 
fields run by the government . However, this was only a small factor in the instigation of the conflict . 
Instead, resources became much more significant as the conflict went on . Once they had lost the support 
of the civilian population, the RUF was driven into a guerrilla insurgency in which they needed backing and 
arms from Charles Taylor in Liberia . In return for this support Taylor took vast quantities of diamonds from 
the fields in Sierra Leone, most of which were controlled by the RUF . In this way, the country’s resources 
became crucial in prolonging the conflict, a role far more significant than they had played in actually 
starting it . 
How was that issue dealt with?
The Lomé Peace Agreement was signed by the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) rebels, in July 1999 . The agreement was a follow-up of the 1996 agreement, which had been 
violated by all parties to the conflict . The Lomé Agreement provided for a UN-monitored and a new national 
army made up of both parties . Although the rebels were to go through a DDR process, the agreement 
gave them extremely favourable terms via a power-sharing agreement at all levels of government, with 
the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh assuming the position of Vice President . In addition, the previously 
imprisoned Sankoh was given the position of Chairman of the Commission for the Management of 
Strategic Resources . 
However, the agreement did not hold as elements of the RUF re-entered hostilities . The conflict only ended 
in 2002, following foreign intervention and the death of Sankoh . 
In terms of resources, the most significant part of the agreement was the appointment of Sankoh to 
lead the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources . This was an extraordinary concession 
to make as the Commission would essentially be in charge of managing the country’s diamond fields 
where much of the fiercest fighting had taken place . The agreement set out a new approach to the 
exploitation of gold and diamonds and the use of their proceeds, but there was some confusion and 
conflict related to the role or powers of the CMRRD . While the agreement called for the Ministry of Mines 
to carry out its normal functions, including the issuing of mining licences, it also nullified all previous 
concessions and banned “all exploitation, sale, export or any other transaction of gold and diamonds 
except if allowed by the CMRRD” .
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On paper, the CMRRD was to be an autonomous body, whose head was responsible only to the 
president . Amidst such confusion, the CMRRD was never really constituted and Sankoh simply ignored 
his appointment and continued to fund his military and political programmes through mining proceeds 
from RUF activities in Kono District .
Useful source: http://www .c-r .org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/contents .php
Liberia 
Accra Peace Agreement (2003)
http://www .usip .org/files/file/resources/collections/peace _ agreements/liberia _ 08182003 .pdf
Extent to which land/resources were an issue
The primary conflict dynamic in Liberia was the struggle for state power along ethnic lines and so the issues 
of land and resources were not the principal cause of conflict . During the course of the country’s wars 
there was however ruthless exploitation of forestry, mineral and other natural resources for the purposes 
of self-enrichment and for the financing and arming of private militias .
While land rights were not a key grievance of the rebel groups, the extensive and protracted nature of 
the conflict in Liberia has made the land issue an extremely significant one and one that threatens to 
undermine the future stability of the country . 
The extended duration of the conflict devastated the systems that regulated access to land before 
the outbreak of hostilities . Violence often deliberately targeted the infrastructure of state and non-state 
institutions and authorities . The war provided an opportunity for individuals to settle scores, loot and destroy 
which often centred on property and land .
The conflict in Liberia displaced hundreds of thousands of people and the main problems occurred when 
those refugees came to return to their place of origin . The repeated dispersal of the population forced 
individuals and groups to forge new networks upon which they could rely, which in turn produced new 
informal systems of authority and power . Old linkages were severed or irreversibly altered .
How was that issue dealt with?
A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Accra in 2003 between the Government of Liberia 
and the rebel groups LURD and MODEL . This peace agreement stipulated a transitional power sharing 
government, the National Transitional Government of Liberia . The parties reaffirmed an earlier ceasefire 
and agreed to a national process of cantonment, disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and 
reintegration of the armed forces . Further stipulations included a new national army, a restructuring of the 
security forces, a National Police Force, an Immigration Force, a Special Security Service, custom security 
guards and other statutory security units . It also called for elections to be held no later than 2005, and 
had articles on the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, and recommendations for a general amnesty and 
the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission . 
As mentioned in the previous column, the return of refugees and IDPs has created a serious problem in 
terms of land rights and one that has threatened the sustainability of peace . Article XXX of the Accra 
Peace Agreement states that:
1a .  The NTGL, with the assistance of the International Community, shall design and implement a plan for 
the voluntary return and reintegration of Liberian refugees and internally displaced persons, including 
non-combatants, in accordance with international conventions, norms and practices . 
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b .  Refugees or internally displaced persons, desirous of returning to their original Counties or permanent 
residences, shall be assisted to do so . 
c .  The Parties commit themselves to peaceful co-existence amongst returnees and non-returnees in all 
Counties .
Beyond this, however, there are no details of the plan for the return of refugees and there are no specific 
provisions made for the issue of land . 
In 2008, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, set up by the Accra Peace Agreement, reported that 
land disputes were a key threat to peace and that if the issue was not addressed there was a strong 
likelihood of a return to violence . It also argued that the planned land commission would not be sufficient 
to deal with the crisis . NGOs report at least 250 deaths due to land disputes since the end of the war in 
2003 .
President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf announced in 2009 that the government would set up a fund to compensate 
returnees forced to relocate . But many want to mount legal battles to reclaim their land instead, and 
cannot afford to . A national land commission was appointed in August 2009 with the objective of reviewing 
land policy .
Source: 
www .alertnet .org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/ff8db639fc6363cfdf9b3a39544b51bc .htm
Norwegian Refugee Council, The Logic of Land, (2010)
http://www .nrc .no/arch/img .aspx?file _ id=9481898
Chad
Tripoli II Agreement (2002)
http://www .pcr .uu .se/gpdatabase/peace/Cha%2020020107 .pdf
Yebibou Agreement (2005) – No copy available
Extent to which land/resources were an issue
The Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) was formed in 1998, when it launched an 
armed insurgency in northern Chad under the leadership of President Idriss Deby’s former defence chief, 
Youssouf Togoimi . He sought to overthrow the government, which he claimed was ‘dictatorial’ . The clash 
should also be seen in ethnic terms as Togoimi was a Toubou and Déby a Zaghawa . Land and resources 
were not a significant issue in this conflict which centred around power structures and ethnicity . 
How was that issue dealt with?
In 2000, Chad’s President Idris Deby initiated talks with what was, at the time, the only remaining active 
rebel group, MDJT . The negotiations were held in Sirte, Libya, and Colonel Ghadafi was reportedly 
instrumental in bringing them about . However, no progress was made until January 2002, when a peace 
agreement was signed, known as the Triopoli II agreement . However, the agreement broke down after 
only a few months, with both sides accusing the other of violating the accord . Subsequently, fighting 
ensued and in September 2002, MDJT’s leader, Youssouf Toigoimi was killed . This event caused splits 
within the movements, resulting in a faction under Brig . Gen . Adoum Togoi breaking away and signing a 
ceasefire agreement with the government . The accord was, however, rejected by the mainstream MDJT . 
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Negotiations between MDJT and the Government restarted in 2004 and continued in 2005 and lead to 
the signing of a peace agreement 18 Augusti 2005 . The name of the agreement is Yebibou Agreement 
2005 and it contained twelve points, the first being the establishment of an immediate ceasefire followed 
by the suspension of all military actions .
The peace agreements between the government and the MDJT in 2002 and 2005, do not address 
the issues of land and resources . They are both short documents that provide for ceasefires and for the 
integration of MDJT fighters into the national army and civil service . The MDJT would transform into a 
political party and participate in civilian politics . 
The failure to address any issues beyond demobilisation of rebel forces and the inclusion of their members 
in that national army and government is symptomatic of other peace agreements in Chad over the last 
15 years, such as the ‘Reconciliation Agreement’ in 1999 with the MDD rebels . 
Source: Uppsula Conflict Data Program
http://www .pcr .uu .se/gpdatabase/gpcountry .php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern _ Africa
Niger
Agreement Establishing Peace Between the Government of the Republic of Niger and the ‘Organisation 
de la Résistance Armée (ORA) (Organisation of the Armed Resistance) (1995) 
http://www .pcr .uu .se/gpdatabase/peace/nig19950415 .pdf
Extent to which land/resources were an issue
The period 1990-1995 saw uprisings by Tuareg groups in both Niger and Mali, in protest against what they 
perceived to be a lack of attention by central government . In northern Niger (specifically in Aïr and Azawad), 
where the Tuareg ethnic group constitutes a clear majority of the population, armed Tuareg-dominated 
groups rose seeking greater decentralisation of political power in the whole country or autonomy for their 
home regions .
At the heart of the 1990 Tuareg uprising in Mali and Niger was the protection of Tuareg culture, and the 
nomadic way of life, which sustains that culture . Thousands of Tuaregs affected by drought were forced 
to abandon their nomadic lifestyle . Many young Tuareg fled north and joined guerrilla groups and the 
Libyan army, and many elderly fled south to beg in the larger cities . They began to return to Niger in 1990 
from Libya and Algeria, and demanded greater autonomy, development projects that would ease the 
damage wrought by the famine, and an end to their exclusion from local political power . Some returning 
Tuareg had served in the Libyan army, and brought guns and rocket launchers home with them . They 
found themselves in trouble with the authorities and attempts to disarm them led to violence and arrests . 
The conflict soon escalated into a full rebellion with the Tuareg demanding regional autonomy and 
development projects for the region .
Clearly, the issue of land and resources was significant in this conflict, with the issue at stake being the 
level of control for regional groups over their own territory .
How was that issue dealt with?
On 15 April 1995 the Niger government signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the CRA, now 
renamed the ORA in Niamey, Niger .
The agreement instituted a ceasefire, and also reaffirmed the earlier ceasefire from 1994 . The agreement 
further stipulated a restructuring of the armed forces of Niger, which entailed an integration of ORA fighters 
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into its ranks . There were also reforms in the security sector, with rebel integration into these forces and the 
creation of a special security task force for the northern areas of Niger (Air and Azawad) .
The incompatibility was resolved through a decentralization plan, building upon the earlier Ouagadougou 
Accord (1994), but with more far-reaching reforms . The devolved powers to the municipal and regional 
entities were the right to maintain their own assemblies and executive, implementation, social, cultural and 
economic powers . Special emphasis was also placed on the economic, social and cultural development 
of the Tuareg areas, including the fair allocation of dividends from the country’s mineral resources . In 
clause 22 the government commits to “take all necessary steps in order to continue and accelerate 
the efforts of investment in the pastoral zone”, including the breeding of livestock and development of 
agriculture . A peace committee was established to ensure implementation of the agreement . Finally, 
the government proclaimed a general amnesty and a resettlement program for those displaced both 
internally and externally .
Throughout the rest of 1995, Niger was relatively peaceful . Yet little progress was made on implementing 
the peace accord . In 2003, however, the largely Tuareg composition of the Republican Guard showed 
the government was attempting to uphold the reintegration portion of the peace agreement with the 
Tuareg rebels . However, there still exists dissatisfaction in the government’s implementation of the cease-
fire amongst the Tuareg . They want more control over their resources within their territory . Many of the 
grievances that sparked the 1990 uprising have not yet been resolved . The Niger Tuareg still desire greater 
regional autonomy in addition to increased funds for development projects and increased economic 
opportunities . Cultural grievances, especially regarding language, are also still salient . Niger’s Tuaregs 
continue to watch closely the development and economic activities of the government, especially 
regarding the Aïr Mountains’ burgeoning tourist trade, and Arlit’s recovering uranium industry .
Sources:
Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Tuareg in Niger, 31 December 2003, available at: http://www .
unhcr .org/refworld/docid/469f3ab81e .html 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program: http://www .pcr .uu .se/gpdatabase/gpcountry .php?id=118&r 
egionSelect=1-Northern _ Africa#
Mali
Tamanrasset Accord (1991)
http://www .pcr .uu .se/gpdatabase/peace/mal19910106 .pdf
National Pact (1992)
http://www .pcr .uu .se/gpdatabase/peace/Mal%2019920411fr .pdf
Extent to which land/resources were an issue
As in Niger, throughout the 1990s there was sporadic fighting between Touareg and Arab rebel groups 
on one side and the Malian government on the other, over the status of the Azawad region in northern 
Mali . With some seeking independence and others fighting for autonomy, the rebels have at times been 
very successful in fighting the government on their own home turf .
Azaouad is a name that traditionally designates a huge zone north of Timbuktu . The insurgency movements 
used it to designate the three northern regions, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, which cover some two-thirds of the 
national territory of Mali – though the region is called simply ‘the North of Mali’ in later peace agreements . 
After the army’s reprisal attacks, they were soon joined by Arabs who organized their own Arabic Islamic 
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Front of Azaouad (FIAA) . The rebels had the support of all ethnic groups in the north for at least the first 
year . In this period, the main divide was between the north and the central government . Northern solidarity 
transcended any local inter-ethnic tensions over resources or social differences .
As in Niger, the conflict in Mali is the product of a long period of social exclusion of the northern region 
dating from the colonial period . The north was particularly hard hit by the droughts of 1972-73 and 1983-85 . 
Insufficient relief efforts, often perceived as deliberate neglect, led many to flee to neighbouring countries . 
Many northern migrant men became soldiers in Libya’s ‘Islamic Legion’ and received sophisticated military 
training and experience fighting in Chad and in Lebanon . Some aspired to use this experience to address 
the problems of marginalization of northern Mali . This aspiration was compounded by the widespread 
feeling of hopelessness for their future among the north’s younger generations .
How was that issue dealt with?
In January 1991 a peace agreement was signed between the government and the Azwad People’s 
Movement (MPA), known as the Tamanrasset Accord . There were generous concessions from the govern-
ment who agreed to move their troops out of all pasture land and densely populated regions in the north . 
Internal autonomy was to be granted to the Adrar region and additional state funds were to be allocated 
to the development of the region . However, opponents of the government were angry that they had 
conceded so much to the rebels and the failure to represent Songhoy communities at the negotiations 
led to fears that the agreement would install Tuareg dominance in the north . In March 1991, the regime 
was overthrown in a military coup . The incoming government did not consider the Tamanrasset Accord 
as legitimate and made little effort to implement it . 
Violence in the north escalated again with the emergence of two new and more aggressive movements: 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Azaouad (FPLA) and the Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of 
Azaouad (ARLA) . In late 1991 a new negotiating strategy was pursued by the government which bought 
civil society more into the fold . A series of preparatory and negotiating meetings took place before the 
National Pact was signed in Bamako, Mali in April 1992 . The agreement was based on four key points: 
peace and security in the north; national reconciliation; special initiatives to promote socio-economic 
development in the north; and according the north a special status within the framework of the unitary 
state of Mali .
After the signing, interim President Touré admitted the systematic neglect of the development of the north 
as the primary source of the conflict, which was an important step . However, effective implementation 
proved difficult . The weak government struggled to control the army and local units continued to fight 
their own war, while rebels in the north fragmented and pursued their own agendas . In addition, there 
were few resources to implement the substantive provisions in the agreement regarding socio-economic 
development . International donors showed little interest in Mali and the peace settlement . Of those that 
did make pledges to support the National Pact with investments, few fulfilled their commitments . Local 
communities needed to adapt the agreement to their situation but insecurity made it difficult for local 
civil society to act . Thus there was little in the way of a ‘peace dividend’ and it was difficult to make any 
substantial changes in living conditions .
There was a period of relative calm after 1995 when the rebel groups disbanded but the conflict erupted 
again in 2007 when a new rebel group emerged . Their capacity was seriously hindered when the 
government launched a major army offensive in January 2009 .
Sources:
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme: http://www .pcr .uu .se/gpdatabase/gpcountry .php?id=103&value=
Conciliation Resources: http://www .c-r .org/our-work/accord/public-participation/malis-peace-process .php
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Lessons to be learned
•	 The Liberia example (and to some extent Angola) shows that in a conflict where there are large 
numbers of IDPs and refugees, provisions not only have to be made for their safe return, but also for 
land issues to be resolved . In a conflict that has gone on for many years, like the one in Liberia, this 
will be a complicated process and will need a dedicated body to oversee it .
•	 Failure to address the land issue at the same time as the peace process can lead to a situation, as 
in both Angola and Mozambique, where communities continued to be exploited after the conflict as 
they were not protected by rigorous land laws . In Angola land remained in the hands of the elite, and 
in Mozambique the government sold off vast swathes of communal land to private enterprise before 
any new regulations were brought in .
•	 The Sierra Leone example illustrates the importance of allocating responsibility for a country’s natural 
resources in a peace agreement, especially if they have played a significant role during the conflict . 
Giving complete control of resources to the rebel group, as was effectively the case in Sierra Leone, 
removes a large amount of authority from the government and threatens to de-stabilize the peace 
process . 
•	 The peace agreement in Niger is, to a certain degree, a good example of one that addresses the 
fundamental issues at stake in the conflict . The government agreed not only to bring members of the 
rebel groups into the government and share in decision-making, but also made specific commitments 
on issues of agrarian development and equitable usage of natural resources . The problem in Niger was 
that the concessions made to the rebel groups were not followed up with successful implementation .
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1 Action Point 13 DDPD Draft Implementation Schedule which links to paragraph 172 “Competition 
over pasture and water between herders and farmers is a serious problem in Darfur which shall be 
addressed in a comprehensive way…”
2 Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2007: xxx)
3 Cotula et al (2005: 1)
4 UN (2012)
5 Examples of the way these changes are reflected in the environmental sector include the transfer 
of the Irrigation department from the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources to the Ministry of 
Agriculture in December 2011 and the formation of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity in 
August 2012 . Similarly at state level e .g . the South Darfur Ministry of Water Resources and Environment 
was established in May 2010 and disbanded in March 2012 . Water was moved to the Ministry of 
Urban Planning and Public Utilities while the environmental mandate was included in the new Ministry 
of Youth, Sports, Environment and Tourism in April 2012 .
6 See, for example, Ahmed, (2010), Abdul Jalil et al (2007), Morton (2011) Bromwich (2009)
7 Action Point 13 DDPD Draft Implementation Schedule which links to paragraph 172 “Competition 
over pasture and water between herders and farmers is a serious problem in Darfur which shall be 
addressed in a comprehensive way…”
8 Bromwich (2009)
9 As reported in Graham et al (2003)
10 See http://www .unhchr .ch/huridocda/huridoca .nsf/(Symbol)/E .CN .4 .RES .2000 .64 .En?Opendocument 
on UN Resolution 2000/64
11 Jaspers F . Introduction to Water Law – Lecture notes 2007 UNESCO-IHE Delft
12 For a practical discussion of this, see P . Kerkhof (2000) ‘Local Forest Management in the Sahel: Towards 
a new social contract’,SOS Sahel .
13 For example, UNEP’s focus is to promote informed decision-making to enhance global and regional 
environmental cooperation – see: http://www .unep .org/environmentalgovernance/UNEPsWork/
tabid/347/Default .aspx
14 See http://www .unep .org/ecosystemmanagement/Introduction/tabid/293/language/en-US/Default .
aspx (last viewed 21st October 2011)
15 This was part of the project “Sustainable Options for Livelihood Solutions and Environmental 
Security-SOLSES”
16 DRA are introducing CEAPs in Darfur . http://www .dra-sudan .org/programme .php The Practical Action 
Methodology is called Participatory Action Plan Development (PAPD) . http://practicalaction .org/
where-we-work-sudan 
17 In Darfur, it is easy to see how the absence of this has been a driver of the conflict at the local 
level, for example the interests of the Northern Rizeygat, without their own dar (tribal land), were not 
well-protected which left them open to manipulation by different political agendas in the early years 
of the conflict (Young et al, 2009)
18  The World Bank has adopted a definition of civil society in accordance with a number of leading 
research centres in which they use ’the term civil society to refer to the wide array of non-governmental 
86 Governance for Peace over Natural Resources
and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values 
of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations . Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organisations: 
community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, 
charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, and foundations’ . This 
definition covers traditional leadership, known in Sudan as the Native Administration . 
19 Much of this draws originally on Amartya Sen’s seminal work on entitlements .
20 Jeremy Swift (personal communication) warns against focusing just on poor households in isolation 
from their community of origin . Where the community is the primary user, this includes both rich and 
poor households
21 See Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2007:18) for an interesting comparison between an agro-industrial 
market system and indigenous NRM systems .
22 For example, Lane (1998) describes how pastoral communal tenure in Africa ranges from true 
common property to individual private property within the communal system .
23 Natural resource accounting (NRA) may help in this respect, as a set of innovative tools that identify 
the contribution of natural resources to a country’s economic growth, as quoted in Hesse and 
MacGregor, (2006) .
24 Frustrated by the inability of official data to capture the contribution of pastoralism to the economy, 
partly because of its significant informal dimension, Hesse and Macgregor (2006) have developed a 
tool – the Total Economic Value (TEV) – to provide a more complete picture of the impact and value 
of pastoralism . The TEV attempts to measure both market and non-market values . It divides this up 
into direct values such as subsistence production for household and community consumption and 
trade in livestock and animal products, and indirect values which include environmental benefits 
such as ecological and rangeland services and maintaining the balance and stability of pastures .
25 See, for example, Netting (1981) .
26 Principle 25 Rio Declaration
27 A strong link to Sudan exists as former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mansour 
Khalid, was the deputy chairman of the commission . (The commission was led by Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, former the Prime Minister of Norway)
28 Carrying capacity is a concept that struggles to do justice to the complexity of resource use in 
variable environments such as the Sahel – vegetation is dependent on rainfall which is highly variable 
seasonably, annually and geographically . Migration as a livelihood strategy reflects this variability . 
29 The term physical sustainability is only used twice in the Brundtland report and indicates a limited 
perspective on sustainability in terms of ensuring physical resources are not depleted, rather than 
considering broader concepts of enhancing resource use through technological change or improved 
organisations (e .g . governance) .
30 The 10,000 Wells for Darfur Initiative was based on the work undertaken by Boston University and the 
so-called “Ancient mega-lake” in North Darfur . Other high profile, assets based initiatives for peace in 
Darfur include the RTF remote sensing and an initiative to plant 100 M trees . The Darfur International 
Water Conference was an improvement on these initiatives in that issues around governance of 
water, particularly IWRM came higher up the agenda .
31 Adapted from http://www .unep .org/40thanniversary/ 
32 For example principle 7 of the Rio declaration “In view of the different global contribution to 
environmental degradation, states shall have common but differentiated responsibilities” provides 
the basis on which, in 1997 the Kyoto protocol places a higher burden on developed countries than 
87Governance for Peace over Natural Resources
developing countries, committing them to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions against a 1990 
baseline .
33 As the context changes so do negotiating positions: an ongoing evolution of environmental 
governance is therefore a realistic expectation . For example, the relative levels of development 
between nations which informs the key lists in the Annexes for respective responsibilities have changed . 
The categorization of these countries in the same way hasn’t got the same rationale as when they 
were first drawn up . Some countries initially in favour have now withdrawn from the agreement .
34 Munang et al make the case that ecosystems-based approaches have multiple co-benefits for 
adaptation mitigation, protection of livelihoods and poverty alleviation . It is logical therefore that the 
management of the ecosystem should bring coordination amongst these relevant stakeholders .
35 Nine Sudanese environmental scientists were among the lead authors of the IPCC’s work . One of 
them, Dr . Balgis Osman of the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources, was among 
the small group representing this large and diverse body at the award ceremony in Oslo .
36 See Nobel Price official Website http://www .nobelprize .org/nobel _ prizes/peace/laureates/2007/
37 The Sudan PCEA was made at the invitation of the Government of National Unity after the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to support the development process designed to consolidate 
the agreement . www .unep .org/sudan 
38 Many of the specialists who made up the first staff of the HCENR had been active in promoting 
the environmental agenda in Sudan within these organisations, and the links are well maintained . 
The Rio Summit gave an important boost to grass roots activism for the environment increasing the 
space for the development of networks within Sudan’s civil society .
39 UNCED was accompanied by a programme of capacity building coordinated by UNDP known as 
Capacity 21 . In Sudan, Capacity 21 projects were implemented by HCENR with collaboration at 
local level with multiple stakeholders that saw the development of state environmental councils and 
plans in some parts of the country . 
40 See Swiderska (2002) . This list reflects challenges in numerous countries . For a discussion of challenges 
in environmental governance in Sudan see the expert review made by Dr Yagoub Abdalla and Dr 
Omer Egemi accompanying this report (UNEP 2012)
41 See Stakeholder Forum for Our Common Future: http://stakeholderforum .org/publications/reports/
IEG-SFpaper .pdf
42 See Chapter 7 for more on pastoralism (see also the livelihoods component of the Sudan Integrated 
Environment Programme at www .unep .org/sudan) 
43 see Box 5
44 Other ecosystems based approaches (in addition to drylands and IWRM) that are relevant to Sudan 
are mountain ecosystems management and integrated coastal zone management .
45 Tearfund 2007; UNICEF, PWC & WES Sector Partners (2009); UNEP, 2008) .
46 See Annex 2
47  The Sphere Handbook (Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response) is 
widely interpreted as defining a right to a minimum of 15l/p/d as the minimum acceptable supply for 
“beneficiaries” of humanitarian assistance . Whilst the Handbook indicates that 7 .5-15 l/p/d is peoples’ 
“total basic need”, in the discourse of entitlement amongst WASH sector stakeholders, including IDPs 
and others, the figure of 15 l/p/d is the benchmark used .
48 see www .unep .org/sudan 
88 Governance for Peace over Natural Resources
49 See for example, IIED et al (2005) and Lane (1998), who quotes a Nigerian herdsman saying: ‘land 
belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless members are still 
unborn’ .
50 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (2005)
51 UN (2007)
52 Bruce 2007
53 See http://www .fao .org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/ (last viewed 24 October 2011)
54 This refers to the tribal leadership that dates back to the nineteenth century, and was termed ‘native 
administration’ by the colonial government of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1922 . 
55 See also Morton (2004)
56 For example, by becoming more accountable
57 See, for example, Tache and Irwin (2003); Hesse and MacGregor (2006)
58 Personal communication, 2011
59 See, for example, de Jode (2009), Nassef, Anderson, and Hesse (2009), Swift (2003)
60 For example, in northern Kenya local environmental management committees and water users’ 
associations are regulating herders’ movements to reduce grazing pressure on stressed resources 
and to reduce conflict over resources (Swift, 2003)
61 There are examples of pastoralist groups receiving 50 year rolling leases from government in Mongolia, 
for winter-spring pastures, and managing them effectively . In southern and Alpine Europe there are 
interesting examples of a historical combination of corporately managed mountain pastures and 
privately-owned or rented pastures and crop land that has allowed grassland to be used sustainably 
(Swift, 2003)
62 http://cmsdata .iucn .org/downloads/iucn _ redd _ indigenous _ peoples .pdf 
63 Ways of programming to promote sustainable and equitable environmental governance are 
discussed in UNEP’s forthcoming report ‘Relationships and Resources’ . This report also discusses 
development of indicators relating to governance and peacebuilding .
64 UN (2012)
Further technical information may be obtained from the UNEP Post-Conflict and Disaster Management 
Branch website at: http://www.unep.org/conflictsanddisasters/ or by email: postconflict@unep.org
http://unep.org/Sudan/
www.unep.org
United Nations Environment Programme
P.O. Box 30552 Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: +254 (0)20 762 1234
Fax: +254 (0)20 762 3927
Email: uneppub@unep.org
